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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: HYPOTHESIS AND METHODS
This thesis considers the diplomacy between two
nations on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, spe-
cifically the United States and the state of Israel. The
"problem" of nuclear non-proliferation admits a normative
dimension almost immediately, i.e., is nuclear prolifera-
tion necessarily a bad thing internationally? For the
purposes of this thesis, one must answer "yes" based on
U.S. neo-realist assumptions. All nation-states are not
equally capable of "handling" a nuclear weapons option
with prudence. A multiplicity of nuclear weapons states
would tend to inhibit the freedom of action of the super-
powers in the regional affairs in which they have an in-
terest. In effect, a multi-polar nuclear world enhances
the probability of at the very least regional nuclear con-
flict, which would have catastrophic global consequences.
This aspect of U.S. -Israeli relations is of some
importance given the highly complex and conflict-prone
nature of international politics in the Middle East. The
regional "nuclear dimension" has also been somewhat
neglected by contemporary scholars, who have favored the
Palestinian question, the recent Iran-Iraq war, or the
political effects of Islamic fundamentalism. It is
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important for the long term that this issue be thoroughly
analyzed if for no other reason than to delineate past
mistakes and future opportunities for the non-
proliferation seeking super-power (in this case, the
U . S . A
.
) . For the purposes of this thesis, we shall start
with the philosophical aspect of this subdiscipline of
international relations.
This is a neo-realist approach to nuclear non-
proliferation as it is the security interests as defined
by power that determine the status of the problem. In
this sense the United States, which is the power pre-
dominant actor, acts as a patron to the client-state,
Israel. Since the U.S. is the power predominant actor,
it is assumed that it ought to be able to periodically
influence the foreign policy of Israel. The power of
persuasion can be benign or coercive, but is always
applied in the name of the common interests shared by
both nations. Those interests are normative in the end,
but are also "realistic" in that they express the neces-
sities of nation-state survival. Hence interests are the
"goals" set by the nation-state which is the basic level
of analysis inherent in neo-realism.
The national actor moves in an anarchical inter-
national environment, Hobbes' "war of all against all,"
lacking a forceful "transnational authority." Nations
2
are both ll.ee t o and forced continually to pursue their
own survival internationally. Failure to pursue one's
interests, or worse, interests unsuccessfully enacted can
lead to national annihilation. A realist reading of his-
tory describes literally hundreds of empires, kingdoms and
countries destroyed or conquered for the above reasons.
This is in part the rat ional-realist decision-makers' spur
to action: sure knowledge that anarchy or national dis-
placement will result from unpursued national interests.
Anarchy is not necessarily universal in scope.
Certain regions of the world tend to interstate violence
and anarchy more frequently than others. There are a
number of reasons for this: composition of the elite
national decision-makers, cultural-religious or economic
factors.
It can be stated that the state of Israel exists in
an extremely anarchic and violent regional environment.
At various times and for many reasons, the surrounding
Arab states have pledged themselves to either the destruc-
tion or the emasculation of the Jewish free state. Israel
has no regional allies and has fought four major wars to
safeguard its interests and existence along with a number
of recurrent skirmishes on the periphery since its found-
ing in 1948. Because it is outnumbered on all sides by
hostile populations, the quest for security has an acute
3
importance for Israeli decision-makers. Security in this
case meaning the preservation of Israeli sovereignty and
its freedom of action internationally. Due to the con-
flictual and violence-prone tendency of international
politics in the region, the security interest of Israel
tends to have a strong military element.
Given this, a nation-state in Israel's situation
will tend to emphasize worst case security scenarios and
will rely almost totally on military power to deter an
adversary s aggression. The efficacity of the doctrine
of national security lies in its reliance on deterrence
to prevent an opponent from carrying out any number of
military threats. Deterrence is the threat to impose
unacceptable losses upon an aggression-minded opponent.
Since a nation-state cannot survive if it is isolated and
under constant military assault, a doctrine of deterrence
is necessary to ensure long term survival and internal
development. Lacking peace, anarchy can only be reduced
via deterrence of specific nation-state opponents.
To survive and to deter successfully, a state in
Israel's circumstances must seek out some type of alliance
with other nation-states if for no other reason than to
offset the radical limitations on its capabilities imposed
by its size, location, resources and population. Over
time, Israel has moved into a client type relation with
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the United States in terms of economic aid, military
equipment and political support and guidance in attempting
to come to a modus vivendi with the Arab states. The
classical realist analysis of this situation assigns the
interested power-predominant actor (i.e., the U.S.) the
leading role in a patron-client relationship in setting
the political agenda. Although Israel is not considered
to be a formal ally of the U.S., there are a number of
benign yet potent political and social connections that
have accumulated between the two countries over the last
twenty-five years. By and large, these "connections"
have served Israel well with little cost in sovereignty
and regional capabilities.
The power predominant actor, in this case the United
States who is Israel's single largest supplier of both
military hardware (a vital necessity and symbol of commit-
ment given Israel's strategic dilemma) and economic
largesse--some $3 billion a year in economic aid alone.
These tangible benefits linked to systemic similarities
between the two countries along with the sizable popula-
tion of expatriate American Jews residing in Israel ought
to give the U.S. potent influence over Israeli foreign
policy.
As shall be seen, the U.S.A.'s power predominant
position may be irrelevant when it comes to non-
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case. This is a
proliferation policy in the Israeli
simplistic definition of nation-state power predominance
but it is consonant with basic neo-real i st ic thinking.
It follows then that the United States ought to be able
to influence the foreign policy of its client state over
certain critical issues. Israel certainly cannot risk
abandonment by the United States, as some twenty-five
years of sporadic diplomacy has not brought any ameliora-
tion in Israel's regional position.
Neo-realism further postulates that the client-state
has only minimal influence over the actions of its patron
since a small nation cannot set the political agenda for
the patron state, or rather it should not be permitted to
set the policy for the major power over a specific
issue. The super-power may not have a hegemonic hold
on the region, but it does possess significant influence
over its client partner, who maintains this asymmetrical
relation out of the necessity of survival.
Thomas Schelling has discussed a similar occurrence
that he refers to as "the power of the weak." In
essence this describes the ability of weaker allied
nations to force a great power to alter its diplomatic
policy radically in favor of the political aims of the
weaker state. In its "pure form" this is occasionally
accomplished by engaging in deliberately provocative acts
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SO that the great power patron will have no choice but to
sanction its clients' behavior in some positive manner in
order to prevent a disruption of its alliance system and
a loss of prestige. The classic example that Schelling
gives is Chiang Kai Shek's occupation of the islands of
Quemoy and Matus with something like one-half his army in
1958 in order to force the United States to recognize and
to militarily guarantee the contigenous waters of these
islands for the nationalist Chinese. By placing the
nationalist army in a deliberately provocative and pos-
sibly dangerous position, Chiang forced the Eisenhower
administration to change its geo-strategic policy in the
Taiwan straits. This echoes this thesis in some ways,
as shall be seen. In the Israeli case it is not a
tangible threat of immediate policy pre-emption (as in
the Taiwan straits crisis) that confers "the power of the
weak, but rather the potential for policy pre-emption
inherent in a nuclear armed Israel that perceives itself
in an insoluble politico-military crisis.
Nuclear weapons based deterrence is accepted by most
nations with explicit security dilemmas as the most effi-
cient means to threaten/inf lict massive losses on an
opponent for the least expenditure in national resources.
The main obstruction to acquiring nuclear weapons is the
rather high capital costs embedded in the facilities nec-
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essary to develop them. Nonetheless, if the national
security dilemma is sufficiently acute, many nations that
are relatively "developed” and are determined to pay the
price can obtain nuclear weapons. Both the knowledge and
the capability to construct nuclear weapons have a con-
straining impact on regional politics and the pace of the
local arms race. Power seeking, in the name of national
security, is conditioned heavily by state capabilities.
Nuclear weapons are in turn a part of those capabilites.
Nuclear weapons are intrinsically important to neo-
realist theory as they have the ability, if used, to
abolish political competition and the nation-state system.
Of themselves, nuclear weapons have no constructive use,
yet human decision-makers impute an intricate and arbi-
trary value to their acquisition. It is only relative to
highly ambiguous terms like victory or defeat or the neo-
realist ethic of national survival that such weapons have
any worth at all. Once the capital costs of a nuclear
infrastructure have been absorbed, though, a nuclear
weapons option is relatively economically cost efficient.
Of course, cost efficiency must be weighed against a more
sober assessment by the nation state as to whether nuclear
weapons constitute a "politically" efficient option.
An Israel armed with nuclear weapons either overtly
or covertly has enormous implications both for Middle
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Eastern and world politics. Since Israel is a "client"
of the United States, it is assumed that Washington would
have a great deal of interest and influence over nuclear
weapons decision-making in Israel. U.S. policy since the
Eisenhower administration has been to publicly oppose
nuclear proliferation in the region and to especially
oppose any Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons. In
practice and in contradiction to conventional realist
thinking, this has not been the case over the last twenty-
five years. The basic research question of this thesis
must ask "Why has U.S. diplomacy failed to dissuade Israel
from acquiring nuclear weapons?" This question assumes
two basic points: (a) That Israel in fact does possess
nuclear weapons, and (b) That the United States has made
efforts to alter Israeli nuclear policy. The historic
record will verify both of these items with dispatch.
It is hoped that this case study in "nuclear diplo-
macy and pa t r on- c 1 i en t relations can help point the way
to a revised theory of neo-realism in international rela-
tions that takes into account the capabilities of allied
powers to deflect and influence the policies of the power-
predominant actor. Ultimately, the whole classical con-
cept of power and influence might need to be revised. For
it may well now be that a client state can under certain
circumstances create and maintain a particular policy in
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a vital Issue area despite strong cues from the allied
major power to revise its goals. In this case, national
survival via ambiguous nuclear deterrence comprises the
vital issue area.
In fact, one can say that Israel occupies an
altogether new category in non-proliferation studies,
that of an ambiguous nuclear weapons state. Israel is a
country that leaves publicly ambiguous both its possession
of and fundamental strategy behind its nuclear weapons.
Given the explicit nature of the security dilemma for
Israel and the need to maintain strong military ties with
the West, this was probably a prudent option.
Hence, if the research question asks why U.S. policy
failed to revise or excise Israel's nuclear ambitions,
then one must also delinate how Israel maintained its
nuclear policy over time given the sometimes considerable
coercion to do otherwise. The main emphasis of this
thesis is to examine U.S. policy and in a subsidiary sense
to compare them to the relevant Israeli counterpol i c i es
.
Analyzing a failed or suboptimal policy (or, as shall
be seen, ser i es of policies) holds particular problems for
the researcher, as one must comment at length on why cer-
tain preferred outcomes did not occur. A "non event," in
turn, tends to generate a disturbing variety of alterna-
tive explanations and analyses.
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It is thought that non-proliferation policy with
regard to Israel has been of unstable saliency for the
U.S. government for the last twenty-five years. It is
evident (as shall be seen) that during certain periods in
recent U.S. history the entire issue of Israeli nuclear
development has been of more positive importance than it
was during other periods with differing decision-makers.
In fact, it can be shown that American policy in this
matter virtually contradicted itself. A mutable policy
is said to be ineffective if for no other reason than a
client state has an incentive to resist a patron's poli-
tical pressure on the assumption that a favorable foreign
policy revision is likely. In addition, as Thomas
Schelling would point out, the client state does have the
ability to place a higher priority and assign greater
resources to a particular policy option than does an
over-extended super-power, comparatively speaking. As
will be seen, Israel will prove i mmune to certain blunt
forms of U.S. coercion due to its status, political and
cultural ties to America. In Israel itself, the issue of
nuclear development has been of steady saliency throughout
seven governments, starting with David Ben Gurion in 1960.
In short, a vacillating unstable super-power policy is no
match under the right conditions for a steady long-term
high saliency counter policy on the part of a client state.
11
As for the terminology used herein, salience defines
an issue of central importance to the national security
of a particular nation. It is axiomatic that not all
interests can be acted upon, therefore, a certain ordering
of issues must occur. This "prioritization" process de-
fines what problems and policies are of high, low or non-
salieney. In the end, interests are not readily quanti-
fiable, but it is possible to determine how generally
important they are over time and whether or not they were
successfully acted upon.
The methodology used herein is a detailed, wide-
ranging review of the literature. These include journal
articles from diverse commentators, newspaper accounts,
edited volumes, Congressional testimony, a few declassi-
fied government documents and various single author works.
Sources tend to be eclectic with the research emphasis on
verifying the facts by playing contending authors off one
another. This hypothesis then has some basis in historic
fact and current academic thinking. To understand more
completely the diplomatic context that Israel inhabits,
it has been necessary not only to review writings dealing
with Middle Eastern nuclear development, but also to
familiarize oneself with the general foreign policy works
dealing with the region.
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CHAPTER II
ISON
-PROLIFERATION AS A GENERAL PROBLEM
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Nuclear proliferation as a political phenomenon
describes the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons and/or
in a more ephemeral sense nuclear weapons capabilities to
"other nations." This diffusion of capabilities to a
multivariety of nations is viewed by both East and West,
paradoxically enough as a dangerous destabilizing tendency
in world affairs. Both the United States and the Soviet
Union view proliferation as specifically increasing the
chances of a "catalytic" nuclear conflict breaking out.
^ cataly tic nuclear conflict is defined as a regional
nuclear exchange between client states that risks an un-
controllable escalation to the level of a direct confron-
tation between the super
-power s . The spread of nuclear
weapon to the Third World will inhibit the great power's
ability to influence those self same events and govern-
ments--espec ially in a time of crisis. The U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. fear a nuclear armed world that lacks the fragile
but carefully constructed rules governing nuclear deter-
rence and diplomacy they have built up over the years.
The super-powers have a consensual view of the
problem which has remained generally stable over the last
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twenty-five years. As such, there are four basic
reactive/preventative approaches that the major powers
have evolved to deal with this problem. The best known
non-proliferation measure is the 1968 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its main institution, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The IAEA was created in 1955 as a result of the
Atoms for Peace" program initiated by U.S. President
Eisenhower in 1953. Mandated as an associated organize
t 1 °n of the U
-
N
- with the express mission to assist in
the promotion of civilian uses of nuclear energy, the
IAEA also has a non-proliferation role as it undertakes
to inspect the nuclear facilities of non-proliferation
treaty signatories so as to prevent the diversion of
material and technology to military uses. The first
function had precedence in the agency for about twelve
years, until the draft of the non-proliferation treaty
came into force in July of 1968.^ Since that time, the
agency has been charged with overseeing the inspection
and "enforcement" function of the treaty signatories.
The non-proliferation treaty, on the other hand, is
a multilateral accord (signed at present by some 125
nations) whereby all parties, unless exempted otherwise,
must foreswear the fabrication of nuclear weapons. In
turn, those signatories' powers are guaranteed "full
14
access to all civilian applications of nuclear energy
under Article IV of the treaty. The NPT is a result of
negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R.
during the 1964-68 period. 5 There was never any serious
dissension between the two super-powers over what a non-
proliferation agreement ought to both address and ignore.
The real conflict centered on trying to draft a treaty
that would be acceptable in the eighteen nation Disarma-
ment Conference and then to the General Assembly of the
U.N. Most developing countries were critical (and remain
so to this day) of the promise of access to civilian tech-
nology and the vaguely-worded "security pledge" by the
nuc lear
- armed sponsoring powers to non-nuclear weapons
states
.
The NPT does have certain flaws. For example, in
order to ensure the widest possible adherence to the
treaty, the civilian promise of nuclear technology has to
be upheld in order to gain a multilateral surrender of the
military nuclear option. Although such a dichotomy may
be in the long run entirely artificial and unrealistic
given the similarity between a well-developed peaceful
and an all-out nuclear weapons program. While practicing
col leg i a 1 i ty
,
the NPT has no mechanism for dealing with
nonsignatories with nuclear weapons aspirations. For
treaty members, the NPT sets up strongly asymmetrical
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obligations, nuclear weapons states who are signatories
can maintain and expand their nuclear arsenals under the
vaguest admonition to seek disarmament. At the same
time, signatory "non nuclear" states believe with some
justification that the major powers have reneged on their
pledge to disarm in a timely fashion.
Despite these reservations, the treaty was duly
approved by the U.N. General Assembly in the spring of
1968 and opened for signature in July of that year.
Regardless of its deficiencies, the NPT has served as a
powerful brake on nuclear weapons development worldwide--
no signatory party has ever publicly "broken" the treaty
and acquired nuclear weapons.
The second major non-proliferation approach favored
by the major powers have been the supplies controls imple-
mented by the so-called "London Suppliers Group" of 1975.
This is a loose organization of Western/Eastern developed
nations (the U.S., Japan, the U.K., Italy, West Germany,
and the U.S.S.R.) who all agreed to practice restraint of
trade in terms of certain types of nuclear technologies.
The suppliers group essentially utilizes a strategy of
exclusion, allegedly aiming its policies at ensuring a
purely civilian nuclear trade with primarily non-
signatories of the NPT. Each member of the group pledges
to honor a "trigger list" of particular technological
16
items such that their export to a non-NPT party by a
group member is grounds for imposing IAEA safeguards on
the transaction
.
6
It was thought in the West especially at this time
that supplier controls were necessary to slow an ominous
trend toward ambiguous nuclearization among non-NPT devel-
oping nations. The problem with this approach is that
with the exception of France all the members of the sup-
pliers group are signatories to the NPT
,
who have pledged
to allow all signatories access to the civilian uses of
nuclear energy. Many Third World NPT members see the
suppliers group as an abrogation of the Western powers'
obligations under Article IV of the agreement. Of course,
said suppliers' controls do not directly affect NPT mem-
bers whose facilities are already under IAEA safeguards,
but it does indicate to the Third World that the developed
nations lack confidence in their own non-proliferation
treaty. Since the supplier controls were inspired in part
by India's ability to construct and detonate a nuclear
device despite piecemeal export controls on the part of
the West, many developing countries contended that the
trigger lists and great power consensus were the first
step in the creation of a Western/Eastern bloc nuclear
cartel. In effect, the West was seen as backing away
from its commitments to collegiality and institutionalism.
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The third means of implementing non-proliferation
policy favored by the U.S.A. /U.S.S.R. is one of pure uni-
lateral action to prevent an ally or client from acquiring
the means to fabricate nuclear weapons. "Unilateralism"
means that nuclear policy for an allied power is dictated
by fiat from the power-predominant actor. This is prob-
ably the most reassuring approach to non-proliferation,
for the super-powers as correctly implemented it virtually
guarantees that no spread of nuclear weapons will occur.
The problem is that the major powers have only a somewhat
limited number of clients over which they have sufficient
authority to successfully pursue this policy. In the
case of the U.S.S.R., the entire Warsaw Pact has always
been denied the right to develop or construct any type of
plutonium reprocessing facilities or uranium separation
plants. Nuclear weapons, both policy and direct military
control, have always been an exclusive province of the
Soviet Union alone in Eastern Europe. The United States,
on the other hand, was instrumental in inducing Japan,
Canada, Mexico, and most of the other NATO allies to at
least sign or abide by the non-proliferation treaty. The
closer and more "dependent" the ally, the easier it is
for a major power to pursue a unilateralist policy--as
far as this truism goes, Israel serves as one of the
except ions.
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Lastly, there is the purely regional approach of the
nuclear weapons tree zone whicn is composed of a local
quorum of nations agreeing to foreswear the production or
deployment of nuclear weapons and further pledge to verify
and police the accord by means set up by themselves,
ihere are two examples of this type of approach operating
currently, the twenty-three nation 1957 Latin American
fluclear Weapons Tree Zone, also known as the Treaty of
llatelolco. ilatelolco" negotiated independently under
Mexican auspices during the mid-1950s, simply provides
tnat all parties to the treaty shall keep their nations
free of nuclear weapons of any type^
it is important to note that the Latin American nuc-
lear weapons free zone is the only one of the four above
approaches to non-proliferation that was ever successfully
generated by a non-Western or Eastern source. The South
American talks had the tacit approval of Washington and
Moscow, who were at the time preparing a final draft of
the HPT. in fact, nuclear weapons free zones, while un-
usually effective, are merely a modification on the HPT
themes of inclusion and collegiali ty . In no sense can
this approach strongly affect the nuclear weapons
aspirations of a “defecting" nation.
The worldwide non-proliferation “system" as such is
a consensual creation of the U . S . A. /U . S . S . R. for it is an
issue that both powers tend towards an easy and consistent
agreement. However, all the consensus, institutionaliza-
tion and treaties in the world cannot enforce a totally
nuclear-free system (and perhaps that is not the goal),
inus, there have always been nuclear aspiring countries.
Israel is of course an excellent example of a country with
an overriding security dilemma whose leaders collectively
ignored the external pressures to accommodate inter-
national non-proliferation mores in order to pursue a
covert nuclear weapons program. Israel itself is not a
party to any known non-proliferation arrangement, save
only the l^bJ Nuclear Test ban Treaty which only forbids
above-ground or sea bed testing of nuclear weapons.
Israel has made it a ae facto foreign policy precept
to remain outside this non-proliferation "system" since
19bb as three out of four of the above approaches are
either inapplicable, impractical, or undesirable for
Jerusalem. As for a regional nuclear weapons free zone,
tnat has yet to be tested in the Middle East and probably
will not be any time soon, due to the potent antipathy
the countries have in that region both for Israel and for
each other. This is an example of the scope of Israel's
isolation in international affairs when it comes to
nuclear issues.
20
CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR OPTION
It is a central assumption of this thesis that the
state of Israel does indeed possess a significant stock-
pile of nuclear weapons and has had access to these
wea
l
ns since at least 1971. This is by no means a
radical observation and is corroborated extensively by
U.S. government sources and the research of such scholars
as Robert Harkavy, Peter Pry, Avigdor Haselkorn and
Leonard Spector, all of whom have either a strong interest
in the politics of the Middle East or in nuclear prolifer-
ation itself. The general consensus in academia is that
Israel has had an arsenal of nuclear weapons for at least
twenty-five years. The debate continues, however, over
exactly how many warheads Israel has stockpiled and the
qualitative characteristics of those weapons. Moreover,
the actual nuclear strategy favored by Israel in time of
war is open to question. The evidence of Israeli nuclear
weapons is far too extensive to address in a comprehensive
manner owing to the vast multiplicity of data accumulated
since 1968.
Given all this, the Israeli position on regional
proliferation is deceptively simple: "Israel will not be
the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the
21
Middle East." This was the "party line" laid down by
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in 1964. 8 This statement has
become the consistent Israeli non-proliferation stance
for the last twenty-five years. In fact, if one takes a
literal interpretation of this announcement, it may
already have been inoperative when it was first enunci-
ated. Why? Both the United States and the Soviet Union
maintain sizeable naval squadrons in the adjacent waters
of the Middle East. These fleets are in fact armed with
tactical and possibly strategic nuclear weapons--by an
Israeli definition, nuclear weapons have already been
introduced into the region (if only by extra-regional
9parties). In a time of military crisis, the rational-
ization can be made that explicit Israeli nuclear threats
do not constitute a "first introduction."
Further, the statement-as-policy does not deny
specifically the possession of nuclear weapons, it merely
delineates under what conditions nuclear weapons will not
be alluded to. In no way are weapons used for deterrence,
threats or retaliatory purposes ruled out. Yigal Allon
in 1965 acting as Foreign Minister elaborated somewhat on
Eshkol's formulation, stating, "Israel would not be the
first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region--nor
would it be the second."
10
One can look at this either
as a veiled nuclear deterrence threat aimed at the Arabs
22
(who were making sporadic efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons of their own) or perhaps it is a statement of
fact, i.e., that Israel could not afford to be pre-empted
in a nuclear confrontation and would have to strike first
at a particular adversary.
Foreign Minister Allon's codicil points to a long-
term nuclear policy at the top of the Israeli leadership
that has remained stable over time. There are two main
facets to Israeli nuclear policy: the decision-makers'
unambiguous determination to use nuclear weapons (if the
situation required) and the public facet which is un-
ambiguous and deliberately vague as to the motivations and
capabilities of the nuclear program. The whole effect is
allegedly to deter aggression via an ambiguous nuclear
stance. An ambivalent nuclear policy that denies offi-
cially but impl i es by subtle means a nuclear capability
will safeguard Israel from the near total diplomatic
isolation and inevitable (and legally mandated) cut-off
of U.S. mi 1 i t ary /economic aid that a publicly announced
nuclear arsenal would immediately entail. If Israel is
only suspected of possessing a nuclear weapon, then the
Arab states need not see this as a blatant provocation
necessitating rapid steps to correct. Such radical steps
might include obtaining nuclear guarantees from the
U.S.S.R., attempting radical nuclearization to match
23
Israeli capabilities or preventative warfare undertaken
expressly to eliminate the Israeli nuclear threat. So
long as the status of Israeli nuclear weapons is ambiguous
and remote, the Arabs are not tempted to enact any of
these costly options.
Israel is, geographically speaking, a very small
nation with a proportionally small nuclear force (though
it is growing at a steady pace). The Arab states still
potentially outnumber and outgun Jerusalem by a wide
conventional margin. Although their combat performance
has been problematic in the past, Israeli military
planners fear that the Arabs may one day find a means to
maximize their quantitative advantages vis-a-vis Israel.
An announced Israeli nuclear option might induce the
Arabs to acquire their own nuclear weapons in an effort
to meet and numerically surpass Israel's nuclear arsenal.
As an aside, it was thinking to this effect that in part
prompted the Israeli attack on the Iraqi Tamoz I nuclear
reactor in 1981.
Hence, ambiguous nuclear deterrence is a useful ploy
for a small nation to dissuade a hostile nearby coalition
from engaging in continuous aggression. It serves as a
step back from actual nuclear deterrence as practiced by
the super -power s . Instead of the question being, "Will
they or won't they use 'the bomb' given sufficient provo-
cation?"
,
the question in the Near East is "Do they or
don't they have a nuclear capability that they are willing
to use?" Ambiguity also (perhaps irrationally) allows
U.S. foreign policy makers to maintain a hope that since
no irrevocable step has been publicly taken by Jerusalem
regarding nuclear weapons, some type of arrangement can
yet be worked out for Israel to drop its nuclear option.
Within Israel, the strategy of ambiguity serves a
vital purpose as it prevents a broad-based political de-
bate from occurring in regards to any aspect of nuclear
policy. Since the national leadership is publicly vague
on questions of strategic doctrine and information is cor-
respondingly scant, there has been very little dialogue in
Israel as to whether or not nuclear weapons are a desir-
able option. A public nuclear weapons stance must inevit-
ably presuppose some type of open public debate as to the
efficacity of said stance. Such an occurrence is undesir-
able to Israeli decision-makers. Although if one looks at
the origins of nuclear deterrence in the U.S. A. and the
U.S.S.R., there is a conspicuous lack of public debate in
both countries regarding what was an announced policy of
deterrence. Military censorship within Israel itself is
also a potent tool on behalf of strategic ambiguity.
Ambiguity or the deliberate indeterminacy of deter-
rence threats is possible only because the state of Israel
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exercises a great deal of control over political and tech-
nological information in regards to nuclear policy. The
actual nature of nuclear preparations has never been ex-
plicitly discussed in the Israeli news media and parlia-
mentary debate even over the general status of non-
proliferation in the region is almost unheard of. 11
Information cont rol /censor sh ip is then an integral part
of maintaining not just military secrecy, but deterrence
itself. Shimon Peres (one of Israel's earliest advocates
of a nuclear option) summed it up succinctly in 1966 when
he said, "As long as suspicion that Israel has the [atom]
bomb is a deterrent ... in our present situation the
suspicion is enough." Such a policy is not possible
without the information itself being subjected to tight
political control. All this is easily accomplished as
the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission has been run under
military auspices since 1966. All this makes it difficult
for foreign or domestic observers to assess Israel's
capabilities and intentions.
The actual nature of the Israeli nuclear forces
obviously is highly conjectural and speculative. None-
theless, a secret CIA report accidentally leaked to the
public in January 1974 placed the entire arsenal at ten
13
to twenty "Nagasaki" class fission weapons. These
would be plutonium fueled implosion type bombs with an
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average yield of no more than twenty kilotons. This was
the conventional wisdom until Mordechai Vanunu, a former
technician at the Dimona complex, leaked a great deal of
information about Israeli nuclear weapons to the London
Sunday Times in October 1986. ^ This unprecedented leak
forced the experts to drastically revise upward the quan-
tity and Qverall sophistication of the Israeli nuclear ar-
senal. Estimates of the total reserve were now placed as
high as 100 to 200 bombs, some of which had supposedly
been rad iologically enhanced to produce greater than ex-
pected yields, in the region of 50 kilotons or so.^ If
this is so, then the Israelis have a nuclear arsenal capa-
ble of both battlefield tactical uses and strategic appli-
cations. This means that there may well be combat scen-
arios envisioned in Israel in which nuclear weapons are
used before national survival is threatened irremediably.
With an arsenal of as few as 60 to 100 weapons (the
current accepted number), counterforce scenarios that
concentrate on destroying the military forces of an
opponent. If anything, Israeli nuclear capabilities will
continue to grow unimpeded in the future, therefore it is
safe to assume that their weapons applications will become
ever more flexible.
As for delivery systems for these nuclear weapons,
Israel has sought guided missile technologies since at
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least the late 1960s. The Israeli defense force possesses
a mixed delivery system potential which includes at least
three types of aircraft capable of carrying nuclear
weapons (the Kfir, the Phanton IIE fighter bomber and the
F-16 fighter) and the Jericho II missile system. The
fighter aircraft are capable of long-range missions of at
least 500 miles on a two-way flight. Given the past effi-
ciency of the Israeli air force in conducting conventional
air operations, it can be assumed that these aircraft are
capable of performing counterforce nuclear strikes against
Arab targets. The 1981 Osiraq raid served as a veiled
reminder to all of Israel's Arab antagonists of the pre-
cision and efficacity of Israel's aerial capabilities.
The Jericho II missile system, on the other hand,
has only a range of some 400 miles, but it is more than
accurate enough for a sudden countervalue strike against
the nearer Arab states. For even within the state of
Israel's pre-1967 borders, the Jericho missile system can
still reach such major Arab population centers as Cairo,
Alexandria, Port Said, Amman, Damascus and Beirut. In
addition, during the last three years, Jerusalem has
pushed the development of the Jericho II-B, an enhanced
version of the original Jericho with a range of some 900
miles. ^ This gives Israel complete strategic coverage
of the entire Middle East and at least theoretically the
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capability to bit targets in the southernmost portion of
the U.S.S.R.
All of this points to one fact, this being that the
original combat mission of Jerusalem's nuclear arsenal
has irrevocably changed. When it began in the early
1970s it was a small arsenal of weapons earmarked for a
worst case nuclear threat against supposedly victorious
Arab armies. This was facetiously known as the "Samson"
syndrome, i.e.
,
that annihilation will be brought down
upon all participants in a future total war against
Israel. However today the quantity and sophistication
of Israeli nuclear weapons are such that a wider applica-
tion of deterrence can be envisioned. Clearly Israel now
has an atomic arsenal sufficient not only to deter in a
last ditch" situation but also deter in a number of
lesser mi 1 i t ar y-pol i t i cal confrontations. Yet to the
present day Israel still cloaks its ever diversifying
nuclear weapons program with the same strategy of ambi-
guity that it's been using since 1960. It is Questionable
whether or not a nuclear program of such a scope can still
be effectively obscured physically and rhetorically as
time goes on. In a larger sense though it is also ques-
tionable whether Israeli security is well served by a
policy of such studied ambivalence and ambiguity. Hence,
since the political existence of the Israeli nuclear
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arsenal is unspecified and ambiguous, then the actual
relationship of those weapons to a larger strategic doc-
trine can be said to be likewise ambiguous. For example,
in thee out of four of the wars Israel has fought since
1956, the IDF has favored a strategy of pre-emption.
Whether or not such a strategy has been carried over into
Israel s nuclear doctrine is simply not known.
30
CHAPTER IV
THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR OPTION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SUPER-POWERS
As has been pointed out previously, both the United
States and the Soviet Union have a fairly stable ongoing
interest in maintaining worldwide nuclear non-
proliferation. This interest is particularly acute when
it comes to the Middle East as for the last twenty five
years both nations have shared a strong concern that if a
catalytic nuclear could occur, then more than likely it
will start in the Middle East as a result of a totalistic
Arab-Israeli conflict. There are a number of reasons to
justify this fear, the frequency of interstate aggression,
the supposedly intransigent nature of the religious /ethnic
confrontation, and the relative close proximity of patron
to client corresponding to the continuing political stand-
off between those same super-powers. In a sense when it
comes to the Middle East the two super-powers fear a type
of "Sarajevo syndrome" whereby assurances given to client
allies are abused in a crisis to the point of super-power
involvement /confrontat ion . This is one of the many
reasons why the major powers do not give their regional
allies too many explicit guarantees of support. Moreover,
a nuclear dimension to a regional military crisis vastly
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complicates matters and is alleged to decrease the ability
of the major powers to intervene effectively while cor-
respondingly increasing the necessity of doing so. The
danger as always lies in the "irrevocable act" inherent
in nuclear weapons untempered by any rules of regional
deference. Both powers wish to prevent the radical dif-
fusion of power to their "clients" in a region that does
not have a history of stable management of power relation-
ships, yet does simultaneously contain definite interests
on the part of Moscow and Washington.
If this is the case, why then do both the major
interested powers continually acquiesce in the Israeli
strategy of ambiguity? It is clear that Israel's total
policy of ambiguity in the end exists at the sufferance
at the very least of the United States which presumably
possesses detailed technical information about the real
nature of the entire Israeli nuclear program. The Soviet
Union also possesses equally detailed intelligence about
nuclear policy and development in Israel.
It is not only the United States who has this capa-
bility but also as mentioned before the Soviet Union and
the Republic of France. The French actually helped build
the Dimona nuclear complex under the terms of a secret
agreement negotiated after the 1956 Suez War. The terms
of this agreement apparently called not only for the pro-
32
vision of all reactor components but also basic construc-
tion supplies and an initial supply of uranium fuel.
Neither Israeli nor France have ever seen fit to disclose
the actual terms of this accord.
Ambiguity would probably be demolished if the French
government chose to simply publish the unexpurgated text
of the 1957 nuclear assistance pact with Israel. This
option along with a detailed inventory of the equipment
transferred along with a chr on o logy of French involvement
with the project would public ly end any doubts as to the
nature and extent of Israel's nuclear option. Yet in
every case, the U.S., the French, and the Soviet Union
show no real attempt is being made publicly to confront
the problem.
Why then do the major powers continually acquiesce
in preserving Israeli nuclear ambiguity? This policy is
passively accepted more or less because it is in the
interests of the major powers to do so as the costs
entailed in going public are extremely high. For the
United States exposing Israel's nuclear weapons status
could only come about in conjunction with a radical
reassessment of Israel's status as a client/ally in the
region. This is a move that would have potent domestic
consequences for the U.S. administration who opted for it
even during a relatively peaceful interlude in the near
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east. Moreover it would also complete the international
Isolation of Israel, embolden Arab ambitions and possibly
lay the ground work for a new war. The U.S. government
bound by law to terminate military assistance to
any nation that is making overt nuclear weapons prepara-
tions. Loss of the U.S. as a military patron might force
Jerusalem to start making very explicit nuclear threats
against its restive opponents, which is the very thing
the U.S. wishes to prevent.
The French, one assumes, refrain from publication of
their 1957 nuclear agreement and/or nuclear commerce
history with Israel as this would expose publicly the
extensive nature of French collaboration with Israel's
nuclear weapons program. This would tend to generate
more western critical scrutiny on current French nuclear
technology dealings. 19 Like Israel, France is not a
party to the NPT and, furthermore, Paris never even signed
the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Overall France does not
have a very good record on non-proliferation issues and
does not wish to highlight this difficiency if at all
possible. Over the last twenty years French nuclear
development accords have been negotiated with such known
proliferation dangers as Iraq, Argentina, and Pakistan.
The Russians are also reticent to publicize unduly
Israeli strategic capabilities for a number of possible
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reasons, despite a certain ammount of longstanding emnity
with Jerusalem. Like the United States the Kremlin fears
a catalytic nuclear conflict igniting in the Middle East
lacking a definitive peace, and hence a certain uneasy
status quo must be accepted. Exposure of the Israeli
nuclear arsenal would only disrupt the status quo and
possibly bring down on Moscow a torrent of Arab requests
for various types of guarantees
.
21
This pressure would
probably come in two forms, either requests for an ex-
plicit nuclear quarantee against Israel or else a direct
transfer of retaliatory weapons to their territory under
some mutually suitable launch decision arrangement.
Neither option particularly appeals to the Soviet leader-
ship as it puts the Arabs in the position of determining
Soviet policy in a crisis based on their interpretation
of Kremlin guarantees. While the U.S.S.R. is always
interested in playing a more active role in the region's
politics, it has a cautious attitude towards any agree-
ments that would explicitly involve Moscow in joint
nuclear decision making. Like the United States, the
Soviets wish to be seen as an arbiter and a patron upon
22
whom the Arabs are dependent. A public exposure of
Israel quite simply complicates diplomatic matters in
ways that would not serve the interests of the U.S.S.R.
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CHAPTER V
ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
PARTICULAR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
In American foreign policy there is a fundamental
saliency problem with regards to specific nations who
elect to pursue a nuclear option. Over time, certain
countries nuclear development is more important to the
U.S. than that same development is at other times. For
this case Israeli nuclear development was of higher sali-
ency for the U.S. Government during the 1961-1968 period
than it was in 1971-1977. High saliency means that U.S.
decision makers regarded the Israeli acquisition of nuc-
lear weapons to be detrimental to both the security inter
ests of the United States and Israel. Efforts therefore
large and small were directed towards dissuading Tel Aviv
to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions. Yet ten years
later this issue is virtually abandoned by a different
U.S. administration with a differing concept of what U.S.
security interests are in the region. Low saliency is
then comprised of a policy of benign neglect, wherein the
patron studiously ignores the nuclear development of an
ally in favor of other allegedly more important issues.
At the same time the Israelis via a number of strata
gems were able to maintain a general commitment to a
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nuclear option which by 1969 became a de facto nuclear
weapons arsenal. Their policy never changed in its
content. The means to produce a nuclear weapon had to be
obtained regardless of U.S. desires to the contrary.
The saliency question is also linked to a larger but
relevant bi-dimensionality in U.S. Middle Eastern policy.
This means that Washington's approach travels along two
mutually exclusive axes. The first option is a kind of
"top-down" approach that asserts that the U.S. ought to
try for a successful regional peace conference that would
in turn lead to a general settlement of the outstanding
issues. If this is the case then some of the relevant
issues would include Israel's right to exist being
accepted by all parties, the case of the Palestinians,
secure borders and possibly even conventional arms con-
trol. This method attempts to settle the whole dilemma
of power and peace in the region in one "package deal."
Once a peace arrangement is found and implemented then a
non-proliferation policy can be worked out to everyones'
sat isf action
.
This is a method that defines nuclear non-
proliferation (along with several other questions) as a
non-pressing secondary issue that is of importance but
not immediately so. In its approach to non-proliferation
it bears some resemblance to the Israeli formulation of
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the 1960s that insisted that nuclear non-proliferation
can only be successfully implemented if there are condi-
tions of regional peace--this the Middle East does not
2 3have. Hence a general peace must precede any hope of a
Middle Eastern arrangement over nuclear non-proliferation
issues. Implicitly it treats the entire question of
regional non-proliferation as a non-abstractable issue
from the "whole problem" of the Middle East. The flaws
in this approach are clear: first that the diplomatic
problems of the region can be conceptualized into a single
dilemma that all parties would have an equal interest in
resolving. Secondly that even if this single concept of
an Arab-Israeli settlement is possible to generate there
is no guarantee of success hence no resolution of the
proliferation question.
The other diametrically opposing view contends that
a general and multilateral peace arrangement is impossible
in the Middle East and that a type of piecemeal bottom-up
strategy is necessary. This option calls for diplomatic
initiative to be concentrated on a series of select pri-
mary and secondary issues which over time if successful
can lead "upward" to a regional peace. This approach
views middle eastern regional peace and security as a
goal that can only be achieved by an aggregate of lesser
evolutionary steps--wi thin which nuclear non-proliferation
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IS equally valued along side other potential areas of
content ion
.
The flaw in the bottom-up approach is that it takes
a great deal of time and effort on the part of all par-
ticipants. Success as in any diplomatic venture is not
assured and if it is achieved it may not commensurate
with the effort expended. Since a long term commitment
of diplomatic resources is necessary, results may not be
apparent for a long time, and it is important then that
there be some measure of domestic consensus on the part
of the national actors in order to preserve continuity
despite leadership changes. Without this domestic con-
sensus on the part of the national actors the bottom-up
approach cannot succeed.
One of the main reasons why Israel has been able to
proceed relatively uninhibited with its nuclear program
is due to the slow changes in the "roles" played by the
client and the patron. Israel's ability to resist "per-
suasion" on the part of the United States is in part
linked to the rising strength of the political tie to the
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U.S. in the aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War. It was
after that point that Israel began to come under some
pressure from Western democracies to make a deal however
unfavorable over the occupied territories with the Arabs.
Having been branded an aggressor and suffered much invec-
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tive in the U.N., Israel began to seek out new and more
reliable allies. Previous to the 1967 war Israel could
count on military suppliers like France and Great Britain,
but in the post Six-Day environment it was clear to Prime
Minister Levi Eshkol and others in the Israeli leadership
that more reliable patrons had to be cultivated. Charles
DeGaulle was particularly committed to a more "even-
handed" Middle Eastern policy after 1967 thus the tradi-
tional assurance of French military aid was no longer
reliable
.
As such, it became vitally important for Israel to
develop some sort of a military-political understanding
with Washington
--especially after the 1967 Six Day War.
Towards this end, the Israeli government mobilized a
number of diplomatic and political resources within the
United States in order to assure at the very least
reliable military supplies. Over time what the Eshkol-
Meir governments sought to do was to build up diplomatic
leverage in Washington in order to safeguard the military
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security of Israel. Accordingly, in the 1967 to 1970
period, Israel stressed the dangers of Soviet penetration
into the region, the strategic potential of Israel as a
regional ally and quietly the inevitability of the nuclear
option if Tel Aviv was politically abandoned. Using these
themes (and a number of others), Israel slowly built up a
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strong political tie with Washington on the legislative,
executive and public levels that made it difficult to
articulate a policy of coercion or "strong persuasion."
In short, attempting to coerce Israel via the threat
at least of arms transfers now held definite costs both
domestic and foreign for U.S. decision-makers as the
1960s progressed. The strengthening of the political tie
to the United States made it possible for Israel to resist
coercive diplomacy over the issue of nuclear development.
At the same time the role change that the U.S. underwent
in the 1960s from that of a sympathetic but detached
arbitrator to that of a defacto military patron made it
very difficult correspondingly for the United States to
apply coercive pressure on Israel with military supplies
at least. Policy considerations contemplated by the U.S.
were constrained by the subtle changes in its role as a
major power with regional interests.
In this case, the power to thwart U.S. anti-nuclear
diplomacy is in part a function of the strength of the
political tie to the patron state at least in terms of
the supply of military material. This is then a method
for taking advantage of the unstable saliency of the
nuclear issue in six different U.S. administrations.
This "technique" is all the more effective if one's own
policy in this case of study nuclear development is of
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stable saliency through a succession of cabinets. As
shall be seen, the question of proliferation in the Middle
East for the United States in turn depends on the defini-
tion of regional interests impended in the two-tiered
approach: top-down vs. bottom-up. It is important to
repeat that if U.S. policy has evolved over the past
twenty-five years it still has not achieved the goal of
inducing Israeli forbearance in regards to nuclear
weapons
.
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CHAPTER VI
IhE HISIORIC CONTEXT: an assessment
in May ot 1937, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben
Gurion in Che aftermath of the abortive Suez War sought
an explicit security guarantee from his European sup-
porters, France and England. He sent one of his most
trusted associates, the young Shimon Peres, to Paris in
an effort to convince Guy Monnet to sponsor Tel Aviv's
memoersnip in NATO. Zb As America was still holding to
an embargo on sophisticated weaponry sales to Israel.
Ine embargo left Israel embittered and somewhat suspi-
cious of Eisenhower's diplomacy. Ben Gurion believed
that this type of American diplomacy would embolden Arab
adventurism. The attempt to get an explicit security
guarantee failed, although after the Suez War, Britain,
trance and the U.S. made a vague pledge to keep the
waterways of Eilat on the Red Sea open for all traf-
fic. Clearly, if Israel was to survive, it needed
military patrons to deal with the danger posed by un-
reconciled Arab states. The late 1930s and early 19b0s
proved to be tne high point in Fr ench- Israe 1 i diplomatic
cooperation. French military involvement in Algeria left
Paris diplomatically isolated in the region, while Israel
required a reliaDle military supplier.
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it was in iate 1957 that Israel and France began
highly secret discussions over the possible sale of a
French nuclear reactor to the Israelis. 26 Shimon
Feres and Prime Minister Ben Gurion were the most
vocal advocates of a nuclear option (however vague)
that might at least partially replace a Western secur-
ity alliance. trance, on the other hand, amidst the
turmoil of Suez, Algeria, and tbe transition to the
fifth Republic, had decided that nuclear weapons were
necessary to playing an independent part inter-
29
nationally. The sale of a nuclear reactor to
Israel was part of a French attempt inexpensively to
build up Tel Aviv's potential as a secure regional
power with a Western orientation. The secrecy and the
rapidity with which the deal was concluded was neces-
sary so as to prevent any American fore-knowledge of
this project. If Washington had any intimation of the
deal, it was sure to try to abort it as soon as
possible. The Fisennower administration saw the U.S.
as an arbitration-minded power in the region, one that
j (j
snould be approachable by all parties. An Israeli
nuclear reactor would not be in the U.S. interest under
these circumstances. The reactor itself was a substan-
tial, 24 megawatt lignt-water type, which was to be under
3
1
the complete control of Israel. The cost was to be
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$75 million for the whole complex, in which neither
France nor the IAEA would have inspection privileges. 32
Through this reactor, given time, Israel could
produce an arsenal of nuclear weapons fueled either with
cheap plutonium 239 or with enriched uranium 238. Both
of these options would be achievable as the requisite
technology was included in the deal. 33 Meanwhile,
Prime Minister Ben Gurion was to continue the search for
either an explicit security guarantee or else an assured
supplier of military material. Despite polite rebuffs,
the Israeli leadership continued to center its hopes on
some type of explicit security arrangement with the
United States regard i ng less of American behavior during
the Suez crisis. Ben Gurion also thought that a nuclear
capability might give Israel some much-needed nuclear
t . 34leverage in Washington.
It was not until 1960 that Israel experienced any
international repercussions about the Dimona nuclear
power complex. During that summer French President
DeGaulle, under pressure from anti-Israeli elements in
his own energy bureaucracy, called on the Israelis to
revamp radically their nuclear program. This was out of
the sudden fear that the reactor deal was a danger to
the region's stability. Specifically, what DeGaulle
wanted was that the Dimona reactor be made public, that
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the AEA supervision be assured, and further that Israel
find another supplier of uranium ore. 36 Taken together,
this spelled disaster for the Israeli nuclear program.
Any one point of DeGaulle's request would be sufficient
to derail the prospect of unsafeguarded nuclear develop-
ment in Israel. Ben Gurion (still the Israeli Prime
Minister) verbally promised DeGaulle in the summer of
1960 that Dimona would not be used to produce nuclear
37 „weapons. He also arranged to have Shimon Peres sent
to Paris to try and smooth over any diplomatic difficul-
ties that arose out of the secret nuclear agreement. 36
Peres had his work cut out for him, for while
DeGaulle was inclined to take Een Gurion's assurances at
face value, he also wanted certain guarantees from Israel
that France's magnanimity would not be abused. Accord-
ingly, by September Israel agreed to a three-point pro-
gram with the French. First, Israel would continue to
build the reactor with decreasing French participation.
In return, France would drop its demand for international
inspection of the reactor once it was completed. Sec-
ondly, French companies linked with the construction of
the reactor would continue to supply all of the equipment
already ordered. Israel presumably would be willing to
assume 100 percent of the financial risk immediately to
facilitate this move. Thirdly, that by the fall of 1960
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David Ben Gurion would promise to make a public announce-
ment of the Dimona reactor's existence and also to dis-
close the exact nature of the research projects there-
39in * fact, with only one exception (that being a
pledge to publicly announce the reactor's existence),
Peres and Ben Gurion managed to preserve virtually all
the Israeli prerequisites in this matter. Presumably
France also promised to provide start-up nuclear fuel
for the reactor once it was completed. Other than that,
to run the reactor continuously Israel had to secure its
own uranium supplies. This is important, as it is
through the irradiation and processing of spent uranium
fuel rods that weapons-grade plutonium 239 is obtained.
In effect, by foregoing the fuel supplier relationship
and the stringent safeguards system that goes with it,
France gave Israel (a nation rich enough in low-grade
phosphate uranium to provide enough fuel for Dimona)
carte blanche to utilize its nuclear potential for
military purposes.
Out of this, the Monnet/La France/DeGaulle govern-
ments helped to cement a diplomatic marriage of conveni-
ence with the only nation in the region willing to hack
French foreign policy. In a more ephemeral sense though,
provision of atomic resources to an ally, even a tem-
porary one, was a sign of French major power status. To
DeGaulle personally, it was initially something on the
order of a defiance of the United States. In his mind
France was willing to ally itself with an embattled
democracy that Washington kept at arm's length.^ In
addition, nuclear weapons for Israel would provide cheap
deterrence of General Nasser's Egypt, which was after
the Suez crisis a major diplomatic opponent of French
Algerian policy.^
Negotiations over the announcement of Dimona's
existence were still going on in December of 1960 when
in a closed session of the U.S. Joint Congressional Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, the State Department announced
that a nuclear reactor was being constructed in Israel's
Negev Desert. This caught the French and the Israelis
by surpr i se-- the Israeli ambassador to the U.S. initially
offered the Secretary of State the explanation that
A 2Dimona was in fact a sophisticated textile works.
Under a great deal of pressure, David Ben Gurion was
forced to publicly admit that Israel was indeed con-
structing a nuclear facility, but when presented with a
detailed plan to verify the plant's peaceful use by the
Americans, he would only reiterate the reactor's exclu-
sively civilian character.
^
Despite great interest on the part of the waning
Eisenhower administration, the matter lay fallow for
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almost four months, until Prime Minister Gurion and
President Kennedy met in New York in March 1961. 44
This "summit" temporarily mollified the U.S.A. as to
Israel's intentions in the field of nuclear energy.
Previous to this meeting, U.S. scientists had informally
inspected the Dimona site and in a secret report to the
President stated that as yet the reactor was designed for
peaceful purposes only. Between this and Ben Gurion's
verbal assurance to Kennedy that Israel had no intention
of manufacturing nuclear weapons, the matter was laid to
A5an uneasy rest.
This indicates, though, an early and strong U.S.
interest in the Israeli nuclear program across two poli-
tically differing administrations. President Kennedy's
decision to accept Prime Minister Ben Gurion's explana-
tion of the reactor's purpose along with the informal
assessment of the unfinished nuclear complex, though,
meant that the U.S., rather than pressing the issue
before capabilities coalesced, elected to adopt a "wait
and see" policy. This was probably due to Washington's
decision to emphasize other political problems in the
region. In the short run, the State Department believed
non-proliferation (though undeniably of great interest
to the Administration) of nuclear weapons was not an
immediate problem in the Middle East. Other problems,
A 9
such as the war in South Yemen and the ongoing question
of refugees, took precedence. Unfortunately, adopting a
"wait and see" approach tends to favor the nascent
strategy of ambiguity favored by Israel. The United
States probably lost here a priceless opportunity to
stop the project before the reactor itself was scheduled
to be completed in 1964. Once the Dimona complex was
on-line, the problem was not a question of what might
happen, but one of what j_s happening in a facility the
more than unusually suspicious Israelis were very sensi-
tive about. In this, Kennedy was yet adhering to the
Eisenhower formula of high interest but severe restraint
in dealing with all aspects of Israeli policy.
At this same March 30 meeting, Prime Minister Ben
Gurion's request for sophisticated anti-aircraft "Hawk"
missiles was considered with some interest by Kennedy.
The President in turn promised to "look into" the ques-
46tion of Israeli air defense. This sale represented
a strong break with the tradition of restraint in supply-
ing advanced arms to Israel. Kennedy probably thought
that a promise to reconsider this relationship was a
minor concession in return for a no nuclear weapons
pledge and informal inspections of Dimona .
^
In fact, the Hawk missile deal would come back to
haunt succeeding U.S. administrations as a symbol of the
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changing role the U.S. plays regionally and specifically
the first step in a long trade-off of U.S. conventional
military supplies in return for no Israeli public reli-
ance on nuclear weapons. The conclusion here is in-
escapable. Had some strong diplomatic efforts been made
to force Israel to adhere to a safeguards agreement with
the IAEA, possibly the U.S. could have avoided an ongoing
arms-based identification with the Israeli cause. In
effect, the government opted to "act" on its interest in
non-proliferation by doing nothing except waiting.
In the interim, though, President Kennedy did
realize that Israel's nuclear ambitions were strongly
linked to its security dilemma. His formulation took on
very explicit dimensions as in December of 1962, in the
course of a meeting with Foreign Minister Golda Meir, the
President verbally declared that in case of invasion, the
U.S. would "come to the support" of Israel.^ Though
obviously never publicly announced, this was apparently
an attempt to boost Israel's confidence in the U.S. so
that the nuclear option would appear less tempting to
Tel Aviv.
It is possible that Kennedy believed that the whole
question of a nuclear option for Israel could be dis-
missed quietly if the security guarantee could be given
to Tel Aviv. The CIA in March of 1963 compiled the first
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of several estimates of Israel's nuclear capability.
The report concluded that while Israel was five to ten
years away from acquiring nuclear weapons, the political
effects of such an event would be highly detrimental to
U.S. interests in the region.^ The fear was that a
nuclear armed Israel would tend to polarize the regional
actors into Soviet-backed and Western-backed surrogates,
thus necessitating intimate super-power involvement in
the politics of the region. 50 Kennedy at all costs
wanted to avoid having the Middle East become a new point
for East-West confrontation, but if Israel's nuclear
potential constrained the U.S. old role of arbitrator,
then a possible security guarantee contrariwise could
provoke similar Soviet pledges to the Arab states.
Nonetheless
,
Kennedy went so far as to assure Israel's
new Prime Minister Levin Eshkol in a confidential letter
in October of 1963 that Israel could rely on U.S. support
in a military crisis. 5 ^ This pledge was never made
public and the letter itself did not surface until 1969.
Unfortunately, whatever Kennedy had in mind was never
followed up on, as he was assassinated not more than a
month later. This, then, was Kennedy's diplomatic
legacy, that he was willing to break with tradition and
supply sophisticated weapons to Israel, and further that
he was willing to make a seemingly secret security pledge
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to Tel Aviv. For Israel, it was clear that the Dimona
reactor held out the potential previously unobtainable
political leverage potential in Washington, D.C.
Lyndon B. Johnson came to the White House having
absorbed much of the Kennedy administration's high
saliency thinking about nuclear non-proliferation. He
was also pledged to expedite the Hawk anti-aircraft
missile sale that Kennedy had finally approved in the
spring of 1963. Hence President Johnson was in some
sense committed to the contradictory policy, one of high
tech conventional arms sales to a nation previously not
strictly considered to be an ally, which was experiment-
ing with nuclear weapons technology. The Hawk deal and
a request for air fighters, however, was not completed
as of January 1964. If a new arms relationship was not
quite a fait accompli, then these requests could be used
as coun t er - 1 ever age with which to press for concessions
on Israel's nuclear option.
In June of 1964, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
paid a formal state visit to the White House (the first
visit of its kind for an Israeli statesman). President
Johnson at this meeting strongly expressed his opposition
to the deployment of nuclear weapons in the region by
Israel. Eshkol, in turn, pressed Israel's need for
tanks, military material and "an American declaration of
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support m case [Israel] was attacked." 52 To justify
this, Eshkol and his foreign affairs advisor, Shimon
Peres raised the spectre of Soviet penetration of the
region. President Johnson was sympathetic to Israeli
military requirements. At the same time, however, he
wanted some type of "guarantee" from Eshkol that Israel
would not pursue a nuclear option.
In fact, what the President got was a verbal promise
to limit production of weapons grade nuclear material,
especially with regard to plutonium 239. 53 Addition-
ally, Eshkol reaffirmed the informal American inspection
system of the Dimona nuclear complex. In the past, Prime
Minister Ben Gurion refused to consider regular visits on
anything else than an ad hoc basis, but under Levi Eshkol
this was a concession the Israeli Cabinet was only too
ready to make. Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir had come
to power in 1964 with the idea that Israel's conventional
forces were more than adequate to secure its interests
in the region. However, the Israeli leadership realized
that through the Dimona project they had the means to
bargain with the U.S. for the weapons systems that the
Israeli military required to maintain credible conven-
tional forces. Therefore, through these judicious con-
cessions the Israelis acquired the military supplies they
needed, yet at the same time the Dimona complex remained
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viable both as a future bargaining chip and a potential
source of nuclear weapons.
^
Publicly at this June meeting, Eshkol enunciated
for the first time the Israeli formula for preventing
proliferation in the Near East: "Israel will not be the
first nation to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle
East. This was, over time, the standard policy refrain
whenever questions arose about Israeli acquisition of
nuclear weapons. Down through the years, it has become
the only policy response Israeli decision-makers will
give (usually) whenever the question is brought up.
Levi Eshkol himself was considered to be a dove on the
nuclear issue. This statement, however, is sufficiently
vague as to the definition of the first nation and the
term "introduce." The Meir-Eshkol faction of the cabinet
apparently wished to appease the nuclear hawk s with a
diplomatically vague formula while emphasizing American
S f)political support and conventional arms supplies.
Levi Eshkol fundamentally sought a de facto American
commitment to the regional status quo. In turn, this was
made possible because of the Dimona reactor's potential
as a future source of nuclear weapons. A nuclear reactor
program that did not accept any non-proliferation safe-
guards (no matter what use the Israelis put it towards)
meant political leverage over Washington. Clearly, the
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reactor and the policy potential it represented was
instrumental in influencing the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations toward a reassessment of the political-
military commitment to Israel's survival. American
interest in regional non-proliferation meant that Israel
could use this issue in the case of their nuclear reactor
to obtain certain political concessions, setting a quiet
but clear precedent.
President Johnson acquiesced in the Israeli formula-
tion of the situation. Since no minutes of his meetings
with Prime Minister Eshkol have as yet been declassified,
one can only surmise that L.B.J. and the State Department
believed that they extracted considerable concessions
from Israel. Possibly the U.S. felt that pushing Israel
too far on the reactor would render them intractable and
belligerent in other policy areas. It is also important
to note that 1964 was a Presidential election year and
Johnson probably did not wish to appear anti-Israeli
over an issue that as yet the American public thought
unimportant. At the time of the June summit, the U.S.
and Soviet delegations to the e igh t een-na t i on disarmament
conference were just beginning talks over a proposed
multilateral non-proliferation treaty--Johnson thought
that with vigilant watching, the whole issue might be
deferred until a draft treaty was ready for signature.
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Meanwhile, Israeli confidence in America's support had
to build up against the day that Tel Aviv could be
persuaded to divest itself of its nuclear potential via
the nascent non-proliferation treaty.
Or so went some of the conventional thinking in
Washington, circa 1964. Here again, the U.S. administra-
tion lost an opportunity to make a strong case against
regional non-proliferation and perhaps to end for good
the possibility of Israeli nuclear weapons. By accepting
Levi Eshkol's non-proliferation formulation and promises
regarding reactor inspections, Lyndon Johnson committed
the United States to a type of "dove's dilemma." The
dove s dilemma in this case being the U.S. government's
tacit provision of conventional arms to bolster Israel's
security in return for Jerusalem's non-reliance on an
explicit nuclear option. The problem is that the peace
of the region is more often than not immediately threat-
ened by conventional warfare than it is by nuclear bombs.
In short, with only transient political promises over
the nuclear option, Johnson was locked into maintaining
Israel's conventional deterrent as a means of preventing
Tel Aviv's reliance on a nuclear deterrent. In a sense,
then, Levi Eshkol got most of what he came for, a public
commitment by the U.S. to the "territorial integrity of
all Middle Eastern countries" and a new arms relationship
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symbolized by the Hawk deal and the sale of 50 Skybawk
fighters. On the other hand, Eshkol did not get an
explicit promise of support in a military crisis that
President Kennedy was considering. In this matter,
Johnson remained very cautious.
At the time of the full activation of the Dimona
reactor in 1965, the Israeli cabinet was dominated by
"nuclear doves." Eshkol, Meir and Yigal Allon wished to
keep the nuclear option as a quiet possibility for the
time being. They tended to see Israel's then-dominant
security dilemma as primarily a conventional one best
addressed by traditional means. At no time in the nego-
tiations with L.B.J. did the Israelis actually concede
anything truly substantive on the nuclear question.
Eshkol and company found a way to minimally satisfy
Washington's concern for non-pr ol i f era t ion-- tha t is,
stress the conventional threat while permitting a type
of U.S. inspection of the Dimona facility. Informal
inspections were an easy concession, as the reactor
itself would not be on-line for another year and all the
technical problems therein not worked out for at least
another year after that.
This, then, was the status quo on nuclear matters
from 1964 to 1968. Israel had successfully dodged the
issue while the U.S. opted to bide its time until it
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could act in concert with other nations on a non-
proliferation treaty. By the time the Six-Day War was
concluded in June 1967, however, Israeli decision-makers
were quietly disillusioned over any hope of a realistic
security guarantee from the West. This particular con-
flict demonstrated quite plainly to Tel Aviv that the
pledges of the U.S., Britain and France to even keep the
Gulf of Aquaba open to Israeli shipping could not be
relied upon. If the major powers could not be
trusted to meet a relatively small commitment as this,
how could they ever be relied upon to guarantee Israel's
national sovereignty?
The Six-Day War in a sense was both victory and
defeat for Israel, with potent consequences for the
future of its nuclear option in both cases. As victory,
the war was a military triumph over the numerically
superior Arab forces. Seizure of the West Bank, Gaza
Strip and Golan Heights did mean defensible borders for
Israel in terms of now possessing a territorial buffer
in a future war. However, this was a defeat in the sense
that Western guarantees and military supplies were now
seen as unreliable and that Israel would have to depend
upon its own political ingenuity to ensure its own sur-
vival. To make matters worse, the U.S.A. had imposed an
arms embargo on all combatants in the Six-Day War,
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leaving Israel without its main military supplier in the
tense post-war environment. 5 ^5
A conventional arms relationship with the United
States as being somewhat tenuous, this strengthened the
bond of pro-nuclear advocates within and without the
Cabinet, such as Moshe Dayan or Shimon Peres. With
this in mind, Levi Eshkol dispatched in early 1968
Yitzak Rabin to the embassy in Washington with the top
priority to restore economic and military assistance for
Israel. 59 In part, in order to do this Israel had to
forge a stronger political link with the United States.
This Rabin set out to do, creating strong links to dif-
ferent Jewi sh-Amer ican groups and lobbying Congress with
more persistence than his predecessor. In addition,
Rabin went to some lengths to cultivate supporters in
the Pentagon as a means of bypassing what he thought
were pro-Arab elements in the State Department .
^
The goal here is self-evident. Israel, while
intent on preserving a nuclear option as an ambiguous
secret, preferred to have a strong conventional force
(and a consistent super-power patron) rather than dis-
rupting the regional status quo any further with a public
nuclear posture. Having been rebuffed earlier by NATO
and the U.S., the desire for a security guarantee had
dissipated in Israel somewhat. It had been replaced,
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though, with a more practical desire for an assured
source of military and economic largesse.
Here, one can see a subtle transition occurring in
U.S.
-Israeli relations. Israel went from a desire for
an explicitly military guarantee of its security to a
more flexible goal of general political support and
steady military supplies. The latter policy goal (if
implemented correctly) preserves the greater degree of
Israeli political independence. Apparently an overt
military guarantee contains costs to Israeli freedom of
action. Obviously, the U.S. government was willing (if
reluctantly) to become Israel's main military supplier
if it forestalled any Israeli push for a formal alliance
and if it meant political leverage over Tel Aviv.
In Washington, though, it was evident that the
administration had new in f orma tion and priorities to act
upon. In January of 1968, CIA Director Richard Helms
personally briefed President Johnson on the extent of
the Israeli nuclear weapons program. The conclusion of
the report he gave asserted that if Israel did not
already have nuclear weapons, it would obtain them within
6
1
"several months." The situation had now evolved from
nuclear potential to nuclear reality. Typically, Presi-
dent Johnson reacted in a contradictory fashion. On the
one hand, he ordered Helms not to reveal any aspect of
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this report to any other member of the government:
“Don tell anyone else about this, not even Dean Rusk
or Robert MacNamara.
“
b2
This was, in all likelihood,
an attempt to temporarily defer the problem, Johnson
being in the midst of the post-Tet Offensive political
crisis. President Johnson had a somewhat “improvisa-
tional" style when it came to certain aspects of national
security policy. Making and putting a “gag order" on
the CIA report is entirely consistent with a possible
desire to put this turn of events to some positive use.
Obviously at some point between the Six-Day War and
the new year, the Israeli government had gone back on
its verbal promise to limit operations at Dimona. Yet
at the same time, the informal inspections the U.S. was
conducting were insistent that no military use was being
made of the reactor. More interestingly though, at the
end or January Johnson quietly rescinded the seven-month
arms embargo against Israel. This allowed Jerusalem to
begin placing much-needed orders for military equipment
with American companies. It is very likely that Helms'
report and the possibility it held out of a defiant
nuclear armed Israel influenced the President's decision
(along with more mundane political considerations, 19bd
being an election year) beyond this Johnson did little
the situation.
b2
else to deal with
Nonetheless
, negotiations were going forward to on
a final draft of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Given the past "tractability" of the Israeli leadership
on the nuclear issue (although they were never severely
pressed on it;, Johnson believed he could convince
Jerusalem to accede to the treaty, his main lever being
the expanding military supply relationship with Israel.
Thus, rescinding the embargo may have helped set the
stage for a future confrontation that would require a
signature on the MPT in return for a conventional arms
supply
.
by mid-spring the U.S. and the Soviet Union had
gotten full assent fr om the Eighteen Nation D i sarmamen
t
Coterence on the draft of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and had gone on to present it to the U.N. General
Assembly for approval. After much discussion, the
Israeli delegation voted in favor of the original draft
as presented on June 4, 19bd.°^ The criticism that
Israel leveled at the treaty, though, concerned the lack
of effective security provisions to non-nuclear signa-
tories of the treaty. bZ+ The matter that especially
disturbed the Israelis revolved around the lack of a
coDimitment by the nuclear weapons states to refrain from
threatening the use of said weapons against non-nuclear
b3
weapons states. 65 The Arab states clearly were not
going to universally accede to the treaty (Libya, Egypt,
and Iraq initially refused to sign) nor were all the
nuclear weapons states, as Red China and France both
declined to sign the NPT
.
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As Israel considered itself a non-nuclear weapons
state in 1968 the implication is clear that accession to
the treaty (while encouraged by Israel in the general
sense) would not serve the security interests of the
Israeli state at that time. This is a passive indication
that Israel had a nuclear option that would be nullified
without adequate security compensation if Israel signed
the treaty. The regional security dilemma being ex-
tremely acute, accession to the treaty represented a
decrease in Israel's ability to defend itself. Taken
together, the arguments implied that unless the treaty
could address the security needs of "small nations"
Israel would not sign the agreement on the grounds that
it was not in its long term interests to do so. If U.S.
pledges to safeguard the straits of Tiran were unreli-
able, then Israel's faith in any multilateral arrange-
ments couldn't be great. For that matter, the security
pledge in the treaty that all nuclear weapons states
ascribe to is extremely vague. Basically, the U.S.,
U.K., and the U.S.S.R. pledge to "invoke U.N. collective
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security" in cases were nuclear aggression is involved
against non-nuclear weapons states. b/ Neither the U.S.
nor the Soviet Union wished to complicate their already
intricate alLiance structure with possible contradictory
promises to oppose nuclear aggression. Since the U.N.
collective security guarantees are ambivalently worded,
the super-powers need not fear being called upon to
rescue, say, Iraq or Libya from Israeli nuclear threats.
Israel was a special case as at least one of the
NPi s guarantors had definite knowledge of its capabili-
ties. Aside from France/Red Cnina, of all the nations
that opted to refuse signature, Israel was the closest to
nuclear weapons status. The Israeli delegate to the gen-
eral assembly made it clear as possible when he said in
May of lSbd: "we cannot be sure of the dangers that con-
front us in the future ." 00 Israel never formally rejected
the NPT, electing instead to reiterate that the treaty
is still "being studied ." 09 Over that summer Israel
repeated Levi Lshkol s formulation that the region was
in greater need of coventional rather than nuclear arms
control. Tne delegation also expressed the hope that the
September conference of non nuclear weapons states could
correct the treaty's flaws. This conference though could
not convince the U.S. and the Soviet Union to rewrite
certain provisions of the NPT and thus disbanded.
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inis proved to be a useful cover to deflect ques-
tions about Israel's nuclear ambitions but it also
expressed the notion that nuclear arms control could
only follow a conventional arms agreement. At this
point Israel had no regional nuclear armed antagonists
and could afford to define the issue as part of a larger
diplomatic problem. 70
The iNPi though was signed by most of the Arab states
during the summer of 196b with intensely anti Israeli
disclaimers and reservations appended to their signa-
tures. 71 in the minds of Moshe Dayan, Golda Meir and
tne Prime Minister, it was wiser and simpler to decline
immediate signature while reaffirming that Israel would
never he the “first" to introduce nuclear weapons into
tne region. Certainly, this was more honest than the
Arab states who desired only to isolate Israel diplo-
matically while expanding their nuclear development under
IAEA auspices. In the end if an Arab state saw fit to
accede to the treaty it was only a ploy to isolate
Israel. if another Arab state refused to sign, then it
indicated a passive intention to develop nuclear weapons.
This was the consensus at the decision making level in
Israel which critically weakened the impetus to sign the
NPT. This view easily carried the day within Israel as
bt>
there was very little domestic or parliamentary debate
over the NPT in 1968.
Regardless, the Johnson administration was publicly
committed to non-proliferation and here at last was the
device to ensure a non-nuclear Israel. In January of
1968 as soon as the arms embargo was lifted the Israeli
Ministry of Defense placed an order for fifty Phantom
II-E fighter bombers with the Pentagon. The Israeli air
force had been worried since the conclusion of the Six
Day War that Arab air capabilities were being upgraded
to the point of being a serious challenge to the IAF's
regional pre-dominance. Much had been made of this pro-
posed sale in Congress; regardless Israel did need the
planes even though the administration was very dilatory
about finalizing the sale.
In October of 1968, after lengthy secret talks with
the Russians about the possibility of bilaterally cur-
tailing arms sales to respective client states in the
region the U.S. administration finally approved the
72Phantom II deal. Previous to this decision there
had been some discussion within the bureaucracy about
trying to make the Phantom sale contingent on either
Israeli concessions over the occupied territories or
else an Israeli signature on the NPT. However due to
the rejection of the "Johnson peace plan" of 1967 by
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both the Arabs and Israelis it was felt that forcing
occupied territory concessions out of Israel without an
accepted peace framework would be a fruitless pursuit. 73
Although President Johnson had publicly announced ap-
proval of the Phantom deal on October 9th (nonetheless,
the Israelis believed this was an electoral ploy to
bolster the prospects of the presidential candidacy of
Hubert Humphrey), ' Israeli ambassador Yitzhak Rabin
was secretly called to the Pentagon on October 22nd to
discuss the deal in its final form. Here Undersecretary
of Defense for international security affairs Paul Warnke
made it plain that in return for the fifty Phanton II
jets Israel needed so badly the United States expected
Israel to sign the non-proliferation treaty. 73 Char-
acteristically Rabin made clear his per sona
1
opposition
to any such move on the part of Israel, he went on to
make the appropriate diplomatic noises about consulting
his government. 7 ^1 His government's stance on the
subject had been clear for five years though, no NPT and
no first introduction of nuclear weapons. President
Johnson had at last attempted in conjunction with the
presentation of the NPT to use the arms and supply rela-
tionship with Israel as leverage to radically alter the
policy of Tel Aviv. 77 The administration was confident
that since the United States remained Israel's only re-
68
maimng ally of consequence in the west Jerusalem could
be "forced" to do the right thing. Hence cancelling the
arms emDargo and suppressing the CIA report can be seen
as preparation for the application of coercion in the
Phantom deal.
in tact this attempt by the United States (despite
its proof of how salient the issue could be) was doomed
to failure. Ambassador Rabin began to quietly urge
pro Israeli members of the Humphrey campaign to pres-
sure President Johnson into dropping this requirement
from the agreement. Boldly Rabin suggested to advisors
of Hubert Humphrey that the vice president would reap
a great “harvest" of Jewish voters if the NPT clause
was excised from the Phantom deal. 76 These pro-
israeli members of the Humphrey campaign included DNC
Chairman Lawrence O'Brien and Senator Henry Jackson,
both of whom urged a “no-str ings-attached" approach to
the Phantom deal on the candidate. 7 ^ Between the
electoral pressure and Israeli diplomatic intransi-
gence (as both Humphrey and Nixon were vociferous
supporters of the Hawk II deal without reservation), 60
Johnson was outflanked, lacking the time and political
capital to maintain pressure he was obliged to drop
the NPT clause and allow the aircraft to be sold
unimpeded
.
b9
Despite the failure of direct coercion the adminis-
tration continued to quietly negotiate with Israel over
Che question of regional non-proliferation. To this end a
series of letters (as yet still classified) were exchanged
between Ambassador Rabin and Undersecretary Warnke in
early December of 19b& setting forth each government's
views on the matter. Having failed to force Israel to
sign the NFT the U.S. government was anxious at least to
get lei Aviv to agree to a common definition of the prob-
lem. Using Israel's own formulation (no first "introduc-
tion of nuclear weapons into the region) as a starting
point Warnke construed introduction literally as meaning
Israel would not construct or deploy nuclear weapons.
Ambassador Rabin insisted that his government defined
non-introduction as meaning Israel would not test nuclear
weapons nor reveal their existence publicly. The
Israeli stance is interesting as having signed the test-
ban treaty in 19b4 Israel could not test such weapons any-
where in the region except below ground. On the other
hand the geology and small size of Israel rule out under-
ground testing hence Rabin conceded a readily accepted
moot point. As for publicly announcing the existence of
nuclear weapons it had long been Israeli policy to keep
their nuclear capabilities a close secret. In fact Rabin
conceded nothing that was not already a part of Israeli
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toreign policy ana on this note the correspondence was
concluded with no satisfaction given the United States.
This incident illustrates the limitations of a high
saliency non-proliferation policy. In this case, power-
predominance and a high saliency policy were frustrated
by the "power of the weak 11 client state via a political
link build-up during the 19b0s. by the spring of 19bb
President Johnson clearly lacked the power and, more
importantly, the time to deal successfully with this
issue. In some sense, then, circumstance and Israeli
political skill daunted U.S. non-proliferation policy in
a hign saliency mode.
Undeniably the specific problem of Israeli nuclear
weapons were of high saliency for both the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations. In all the high level encounters
between the chief executives of both countries the issue
is constantly on the agenda. Kennedy fundamentally
changed tine arms relationship with Israel in an attempt
to bolster Israel s security so that the nuclear option
could be quietly dispensed with at a future date. Johnson
expanded the artns-relat ion and extracted certain conces-
sions from the Israelis over the status of their nuclear
program. however when the option oecame the reality of
nuclear weapons the leverage of a strong arms relation-
ship was insufficient to coerce accession to the MPT.
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Israel made no concessions that it was not prepared
to make in order to strengthen the political ties to
America. Having won a major victory in the Six Day War
Israel was seen as a vital regional ally by many elements
in the U.S. government, especially once Richard Dixon
became President. With the Suez Canal "war" noticeably
escalating in violence no one in the U.S. wanted to see
Israel abandoned at a crucial juncture. Israel, having
pushed its military frontiers to the banks of the Suez
Canal, was now involved in a series of sporadic artillery
duels, aerial dog fights, and other low-level violence
with the Egyptian army. 6 ^ The overall intensity of the
conflict increased during the 19b9-1970 time period, 33
and Israel was understandably anxious to maintain its
qualitative military edge in the face of these diverse
provocations
.
Moreover
,
Congressional pressure and Rabin's con-
tacts in the presidential campaigns made it impossible
for the U.S. to exploit the Phantom deal to "force"
Israel to accede to the DPT. Israeli policy was of
steady strength throughout the pressure of the 19b4-19bb
period. This is attributable to the leadership's deter-
mination not to yield to persuasion/coercion and to their
own exploitation of the political tie to the U.S. bZ|
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The U.S. ability to alter Israeli policy was diminished
(despite the issues nominal high saliency) by circum-
stances, political resistance and a strong political tie.
The new President Richard M. Nixon was not as
strongly committed to non-proliferation policy as his
predecessor. During the campaign he had called for a
delay in Senate ratification of the NPT as a retaliation
for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nixon's
national security advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger was also
known to be very critical of the Kennedy /Johnson emphasis
on nuclear non-proliferation. During and after the NPT's
negotiations Kissinger (while never publicly hostile to
the agreement) was emphatic in reiterating that a rigor-
ous and emphatic non-proliferation policy held long
range costs to U.S. national security. In his book The
Troubled Partnership (1966) Kissinger makes it quite
clear that non-proliferation policy ought not to super-
sede U.S.
-Soviet balance of power considerations.^
Although privately once he became national security
advisor, Dr. Kissinger did make a number of critical
O C
comments about the NPT in general.
Within the first three months of his Presidency
Nixon was carefully briefed on the extent of Israel's
nuclear preparations based on new intelligence uncovered
by the CIA. Ironically it was at this rump meeting of
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the national security council that evidence was presented
indicating that the first Phantom II-E jets delivered to
Israel were being used to simulate nuclear bombing runs.
Moreover an extensive CIA-FBI report was presented that
dealt with alleged Israel industrial-nuclear espionage
within the United States. Most damning of all was an FBI
account of the illegal diversion of fissionable material
from a Pennsylvania nuclear plant to Israel in 1966.
Apparently some 200 pounds of weapons grade enriched
uranium was spirited out of the NUMEC plant in Apollo,
Pennsylvania by Israeli agents with the alleged aid of
NUMEC s President and CEO, Dr. Zalman Shapiro. ^ The
inquiry though brought to the attention of the U.S.
government almost three years later was never followed
up upon.
Nixon's interest in non-proliferation was virtually
non-existent compared to Kennedy and Johnson's, though
on February 10, 1969 he dutifully requested that the
U.S. Senate no longer delay ratification of the non-
8 8proliferation treaty. In public Nixon called for
the widest possible adherence to the treaty insisting
that the treaty was an important step in our "endeavor
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to curb the spread of nuclear weapons." The U.S.
Senate eventually passed the treaty making the United
States one of the three depository powers for all adher-
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ents. Privately however, Nixon's policy views on the
treaty were radically different, at a meeting of the NSC
on February 5, 1969 these views were summarized in the
form of National Security Council Decision Memorandum #6.
This policy brief written in part by Morton Halperin and
Harold Saunders insisted there were to be no efforts on
the part of the U.S. government to "pressure" foreign
90governments to sign the treaty. In particular the
federal government of West Germany was singled out in
NSC-DM #6 as being exempt from "coercion" of any type
(regardless of the fact that Bonn's accession to the
treaty was a prerequisite for Soviet participation).
Other nations were singled out as being exempt from any
pressure from the U.S. also, unfortunately the full text
of NSC-DM #6 has never been declassified hence one can
only speculate as to which other nations the memo speci-
fies. It is safe to assume though, given Nixon's past
pro-Israeli rhetoric that Israel was certainly one of
those "other nations" in question. If a fellow member
of NATO was not going to "be coerced," then certainly
Israel (whose ability to daunt Washington's will was
already on record regarding non-proliferation) could
expect little further trouble from the U.S.
One could surmise that President Nixon was simply
attempting to inaugurate a less-heavy handed approach to
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the issue. If so, then why ignore the uranium diversion
case in Pennsylvania? At least there the U.S. legal
system applied. Moreover not pressuring West Germany to
sign the treaty was a direct contraver t ion of a tacit
understanding with the U.S.S.R. dating from 1966--no NPT
without a Bonn accession. In addition NSC-DM #6 ex-
plicitly states that the U.S. Government was to con-
stantly publicly express positive sentiments for the
treaty while privately foregoing any attempt to press
for multiple accession. This duplicity alone tends to
indicate that Richard Nixon came into office with a
strong predilection to forego the entire question of
non-proliferation. The saliency therefore of the issue
went from al all time high almost immediately to an all
time low chiefly due to the change in administrations
and the attendent redefinition of regional interests.
In late 1969 the last informal inspection team was
sent into Dimona from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.
They subsequently reported to the NSC that based on their
inspection of the complex they could not verify fully
that a diversion of nuclear material had not occurred
91for military purposes. It is significant that this
occurred after the Six Day War and well within the time
context set down in Richard Helm's secret report of
January 1968. Most important of all, after 1969, the
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informal inspection regime set-up by President Johnson
and Prime Minister Esbkol was quietly discontinued.*^
In part this is attributable to the progressively more
unsatisfying nature of the visits for the U.S. team as
the sixties wore on but it is also an indication that
the new administration no longer wished to emphasize the
issue.
Since 1970, the State Department has reluctantly
conducted all its relations with Israel on the assumption
that Jerusalem possessed nuclear weapons. This was re-
vealed at an executive session of the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in April 1970 in the course of a
briefing by CIA Director Helms. The new emphasis in
Washington was on a comprehensive regional peace as
exemplified by the "Rodgers plan" of 1969 (named for U.S.
Secretary of State William Rodgers). This particular
peace play attempted to settle all the major issues in
the Middle East in one package to be negociated at an
international conference. Nowhere in this scheme was
the question of non-proliferation dealt with in any way
as now the spread of nuclear weapons was at best a sec-
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ondary interest of the United States. This is the
long term result of the Six Day War and the new issues
that it generated, nuclear weapons were simply no longer
a priority for the new administration in the rush to
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press for a package deal. As it turns out none of the
Arab states nor for that fact Israel ever warmed to the
Rodgers plan, the Arabs criticized its provisions regard-
ing the occupied lands whilst Israel refused to attend a
conference that did not recognize its existence a prior-
ity. Nonetheless for the next three years the U.S. will
continue to offer various revised comprehensive plans
for a settlement in the region none of them garnering
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much support.
Israel on the other hand now that it was free of
the Kennedy-Johnson concern over non-proliferation was
chiefly preoccupied with avoiding the convocation of an
international peace conference. Levi Eshkol died in
early 1565 and was replaced by Golda Meir the former
Foreign Minister. The new Prime Minister likewise tended
to view the Arab-Israeli conflict in purely conventional
terms. She had well documented suspicions about any
future reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent.
Unfortunately Meir inherited a somewhat more hawkish
defense minister on the nuclear issue (General Moshe
Dayan). It was Dayan along with other "nuclear hawks"
in the Israeli government who probably successfully
pushed for nuclear bomb fabrication in the 1968-1970
period. Given the lack of diplomatic progress with the
Arabs, the escalating hostilities of the "War of Attri-
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tion with Egypt and the lingering distrust of U.S.
intentions after the Six Day War this was the least the
Israeli leadership felt it could do. The bomb became a
very quiet reality for Israel essentially on the cusp
between the Johnson and Nixon admini strat ions
.
Here the whole issue languished until October of
1973 when the Yom Kippur War broke out. Taken by sur-
prise, Israel was initially thrown on the defensive by
the combined Egypt i an
-Syr i an assault. So much so that
as it became apparent that the Golan Heights could be
lost if the October 9 counterattack failed, orders were
supposedly issued by Prime Minister Meir on the advice
of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to prepare several
nuclear weapons for immediate use. As the Israeli
counterattack successfully recaptured the Golan on
October 10, the nuclear weapons were ordered to be
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returned to their hidden arsenals.
The whole story behind nuclear weapons in the Yom
Kippur War may never be revealed. However, there are a
number of circumstantial facts that ought to be de-
lineated. It has been alleged that the U.S. military
supply airlift to Israel that began on October 12, 1973
was in part motivated by Secretary of State Kissinger's
fear that if faced with defeat Israel might invoke the
98threat of its nuclear weapons. The decision by the
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U.s. administration to resupply Israel in earnest dj_d
occur after Israel had supposedly considered and aborted
a possible field deployment of nuclear weapons. If
U.S. intelligence sources indicated to the NSC that
Israel had already prepared its nuclear option for use,
then it is safe to assume that this could have been an
impetus to action in Washington.
Evidence suggests that at the time of the Yom
Kippur U a r the NSC did authorize an SR-71 overflight of
the Negev desert and the Dimona nuclear reactor spe-
cifically. 1 ^ 0 This indicates that there was muted
concern in Washington over the exact status of the
Israeli nuclear arsenal in wartime. Possibly President
Nixon and Secretary Kissinger were caught unawares and
were surprised at the quiet but blunt invocation of
nuclear weapons in a crisis. Clearly, the "bomb option"
is a power ful form of leverage in Washington, especially
in a time of potential super-power confrontation. Here
one can see the "Sarajevo syndrome" in action: if the
U.S. feared an Israeli nuclear attack on its Arab oppo-
nents (with attendant consequences for the super-powers),
then the only course of action open to the U.S. was to
supply the Israelis with the conventional military
weapons it needed to confine the conflict below the
nuclear threshold.
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The answers to these questions lie in the classified
files of the U.S. National Security Council. It is,
however, known that in December of 1973 Dr. Kissinger
requested that the CIA update its three-year-old study
of Israel's nuclear weapons capability. 101 The timing
of this request suggests that the Nixon administration
desired current information about an issue it had done
its best to ignore for five years. This request to the
CIA also implies that perhaps President Nixon and Secre-
tary Kissinger were surprised at the strong leverage
potential in the Israeli weapons. 103
The United States, in turn, was spurred by the
deployment to press for a cease fire in place which went
into effect on October 22, 1973. 103 If the ambiguous
nature of Israel's nuclear capacity did not inhibit Arab
aggression, then it certainly provided an extra incentive
for prompt U.S. involvement, first in the form of a mili-
tary supply airlift and also in the form of cease-fire
d iplomacy
.
The October 22 cease-fire in place was immediately
broken in the Sinai Peninsula--whether it was the
Egyptians or Israelis has never been determined. The
Soviets were apprehensive that the encircled Third
Egyptian Army was going to be annihilated in the Sinai.
Worse, it seemed that Israeli troops had reached the Suez
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Canal, cutting off the Egyptian line of retreat. 104
Accordingly, on October 24, Russian airborne troops were
placed on alert in Eastern Europe and the Soviets sent a
strongly worded demand to the White House via the hot
line link that a joint Soviet-Amer ican expedition be sent
to the Sinai to enforce the cease-fire. 105 Moreover,
the Russians made vague threats that if the U.S. didn't
comply, they would move unilaterally to enforce a cease-
fire between Egypt and Israel with combat troops under
the guise of an as-yet proposed U.N. Security Council
resolut ion
.
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In addition, disturbing and unclear intelligence
had reached Washington on October 24 to the effect that
the U.S.S.R. had shipped a number of nuclear warheads by
freighter to Egypt to be mounted on the Soviet Scud-B
tactical missiles deployed near Cairo. 10 '
7
If this was
true, then it constituted a challenge to the Israelis
strategically and to American diplomacy specifically.
For the second time in twelve days, the United States
was being forced to act due to the introduction of
veiled nuclear threats in the region.
The White House interpreted this as an ultimatum
and recoiled at the thought of reintroducing Soviet
troops into Egypt, or worse, Soviet and Egyptian nuclear
108
armed forces acting in concert against Israel. As
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such, the Soviet proposal was rejected on October 25.
The White House then reacted on two main levels: (a) the
Israeli cabinet was warned to refrain from any provoca-
tive acts in the Sinai and (b) based on Secretary of
State Kissinger's recommendation, President Nixon ordered
all U.S. military forces go to a Defense Condition III
alert. Defense Condition III is in practice the highest
stage of military preparedness for the U.S. at peace-
time. This, along with some very explicit threats
publicly made by Secretary Kissinger the next day, served
notice to Moscow that military intervention was unaccept-
able to the United States. Local restraint at the front
and Soviet caution quickly defused the situation. The
Russians saw no need to carry out their threat.
This was less an example of the U.S. going to great
lengths to protect Israel and more a question of meeting
a perceived challenge from the U.S.S.R. 110 While
Israeli nuclear preparations may have promoted a more
activist diplomacy on the part of the U.S., the DefCon
alert served only to warn the Israelis of the highly
constrained circumstances under which the U.S. would
elect to extend its deterrence. Israeli decision-makers
tended in the diplomatically tangled aftermath of the
Yom Kippur War to note the cupidity with which the U.S.
considered the resupply of Israeli forces at the crucial
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moment along with Washington’s attempts to court Egypt
during and after the war. The U.S. did undertake a quiet
review of its Middle Eastern policy after the war, but
more importantly, the Israelis began to fear again that
U.S. military support was unreliable. Jerusalem thought
that the U.S. wasn't going to worry about Israeli sur-
vival, save only in the event that a possible super-power
confrontation was threatened. 111 In the 1973-75 period
Israel lost what little faith it had in a credible secur-
ity guarantee from Washington.
More than faith, though, was lost as a result of the
war. The whole concept of a general peace settlement was
thoroughly discredited in Washington. In the aftermath,
U.S. diplomacy in the person of Henry Kissinger confined
itself to the very narrow issue of brokering a series of
armstice agreements between the three antagonists. What
the Yom Kippur War did demonstrate was that despite
varied past attempts to the contrary, the Middle East
had become (and could well become again) an arena for
U.S. -Soviet confrontation. In turn, this "confrontation"
has and will be again complicated by the ambiguous de-
terrent of Israel's nuclear capabilities. The "Sarajevo
syndrome" referred to earlier was very much on most of
the participating decision-makers' minds throughout this
crisis. Despite its peaceful conclusion, the sad truth
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IS that very little was undertaken to rectify the danger
of a nuclear confrontation (on anyone's part) in the
region.
The Nixon administration then entered the twilight
of the Watergate scandal at this point. Nixon's own
thinking was increasingly focused on his own political
survival, while Secretary Kissinger concentrated on a
regional "piecemeal" approach. In effect, Kissinger
abandoned the top-down in favor of a very careful incre-
mental approach. The Nixon policy of near neglect on
questions dealing with non-proliferation also underwent
a certain amount of revision during the 1973-74 period.
This was a result of India's unexpected acquisition of
"peaceful" nuclear weapons in the spring of 1974.
Accordingly, the President instructed Kissinger to
organize a revamped national security study memorandum
(#202) redefining U.S. policy on critical issues of
nuclear trade and supply. As a general category, non-
proliferation then rose somewhat in saliency for the
U.S., although chiefly what the administration sought
were tighter restrictions on the export of nuclear tech-
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nology to Third World countries.
This is ironic, given the fact that in the desperate
final two months of his administration Richard Nixon,
while touring the Middle East, publicly offered to Cairo
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and Jerusalem a set of jointly controlled nuclear
desalinization plants. Specifically, he offered U.S.
money and technology to build two 900-megawatt light
water seaside nuclear reactors, one in Egypt and one in
Israel. Both complexes were to be placed under total
IAEA safeguards so as to prevent any dissemination of
material for military purposes. This idea dates back to
the Eisenhower administration's old "Atoms for Peace"
program. It was thought that plentiful access to fresh
water would alleviate the economic problems of the
region, thus having a salutory effect on the political
dilemma. It was also hoped by Nixon that a nuclear
desalinization project in Israel would build up Israeli
confidence in the reliability and efficacity of IAEA
safeguards.
Predictably, the proposal garnered little support
and much criticism in the U.S. Congress as an example of
an unnecessary technology transfer to an extremely vola-
tile area of the world. The Israeli public and cabinet
were extremely suspicious (as they always have been) of
any type of nuclear technology transfer to Egypt. Ulti-
mately, the whole proposal fell through once President
Nixon resigned in August. Apparently no one in the
region could see any reason for such a limited applica-
tion of nuclear safeguards.
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On this note the Nixon administration came to an
end, for although the whole concept of nuclear non-
proliferation enjoyed a resurgence after the spring of
1974, the specific case of Israel became as usual a
distinctly secondary priority. The new U.S. President,
Gerald Ford, considered the spread of nuclear weapons to
be a much more dangerous and significant trend overall
than did his predecessor. It was during the Ford admin-
istration (as a result of the findings of NSC-#202) that
concrete steps were taken to promote nuclear supplier
controls on relevant transfers to non-NPT parties. As
Israel did little if any importing on the world nuclear
market, this did not represent any specific threat to
their nuclear program.
As with both of his i mmediate predecessors, Ford
was fully briefed as to the nature and extent of Israeli
nuclear activities in late 1975 by the CIA. The facts
were as disquieting as they were in 1968. Since the Yom
Kippur War, Israel had maintained a stready production
of nuclear weapons and was pressing ahead with the
development of ever more sophisticated missile delivery
systems. The conventional wisdom still held, though,
that trying to renew pressure on Israel to sign the NPT
would needlessly expend diplomatic capital (which was in
short supply after the protracted Sinai disengagement
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accords). In addition, since the Indian nuclear explo-
sion, the White House and the State Department were ex-
tremely doubtful about the treaty's long term effective-
ness. New initiatives were simply too much to press for
m the delicate post-1973 environment for both the U.S.
and Israel.
President Carter came into office with a strong
general commitment to both nuclear non-proliferation and
to some kind of peace in the Middle East. In September
of 1977 at a White House meeting, President Carter
brought up the issue of Israel's nuclear arsenal per-
sonally with then-Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan.
This is the first time (that we know of) where a U.S.
President dealt with the subject bluntly with an Israeli
official, on the assumption that such weapons did exist.
Dayan gave, by all accounts, a terse and unsatisfactory
answer to President Carter, who wanted to know (in all
likelihood) under what terms Israel would forego its
nuclear option. Undaunted, President Carter promised to
take the issue up with Prime Minister Begin personally,
but it is not publicly known if such an inquiry was made
and what the outcome was.
The exchange occurred during a Washington Minis-
terial Summit that discussed the possibility of recon-
vening the long- langu i shed Geneva regional peace con-
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ference. Secretary Vance made several overtures to
Foreign Minister Dayan about the possibility of an
American security guarantee to Israel to follow a suc-
cessful peace settlement. Dayan himself was suspicious
of such an offer and with consummate irony replied that
such a guarantee would only be necessary against Soviet
aggression. The idea was never expanded upon, as the
Geneva conference was not reconvened.
Anwar Sadat's December 1977 visit to Jerusalem, and
the possibility of a strictly bilateral peace accord
between Egypt and Israel eventually superceded any U.S.
designs for a "general" solution. In fact, at the
September 1978 Camp David talks, one of President Sadat's
opening positions in the negotiations called for a
nuclear weapons ban in the Middle East. 115 Dutifully,
President Carter transmitted these proposals to Prime
Minister Begin, who rejected the nuclear weapons ban.
His grounds for rejection were legalistic. Begin con-
tended that such an accord would have to be multilateral
to be effective and Sadat in this context did not speak
for all the Arab states. Quietly (perhaps as planned)
the proposal was dropped by the Egyptians.
If the "top-down" approach risks perpetually de-
ferring nuclear proliferation, then the "bottom-up"
approach cannot immediately prioritize this issue on a
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regional basis. This is especially a problem when as in
the case of Camp David, only two countries are involved
who have a wide disparity of nuclear development. Begin
was in a way correct to refute the nuclear ban as in the
end it only obtained nuclear peace with one Arab country.
There is a dichotomous view here of regional prolifera-
tion. The Arabs contend that Israel is the proliferation
problem in the area. Israel, though, officially regards
nuclear proliferation as a regional problem. Carter's
piecemeal approach also built on an agenda constructed
by Henry Kissinger which was one that strongly emphasized
territorial and sovereignty questions at the expense of
nuclear proliferation. Despite President Carter's strong
interest in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons, he was
daunted by two factors. First, that the Israelis already
had a deployed secret nuclear force during a predeces-
sor's tenure. Thus the question became one of arms con-
trol for undeclared nuclear powers rather than pure non-
proliferation. Secondly, coming so close to a real
diplomatic breakthrough with the peace treaty, there is
a strong tendency to avoid complicating side issues like
nuclear weapons. Agenda items like nuclear proliferation
tend to be put off until a new round of negotiations.
Of course, four years is a short time to reverse a
ten-year trend. President Carter found there was not
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enough time to get down to specifics with Israel. The
Carter administration did approve the 1977 International
Security Assistance Act, though. This was a law designed
to prevent the export of sensitive nuclear technologies
to known "proliferation-minded" countries. One of its
little known codicils (known as the "Symington Amend-
ment") forces the U.S. government to suspend military
and economic aid to an^ country that manufactures or
detonates a nuclear device. 116 This meant that the
U.S. government had a powerful weapon if Israel ever went
public with the bomb, or even if a future U.S. government
finally decided to put an end to "ambiguity." Carter's
legacy on the issue is that "going public" for better or
worse entails immediate material costs for Israel.
In addition, during the last fifteen years there
have been leaks of CIA intelligence reports to the U.S.
Congress and the press detailing some of the critical
aspects of the Israeli nuclear weapons program. One in
1974 and again in 1978 nominally outdated reports were
"accidentally" released to the public, making it clear
at least to the Israelis that the U.S. government was
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not unaware of the situation. These are too many
news leaks to be entirely coincidental. Perhaps the CIA
desired to activate public debate in a roundabout manner.
On the other hand, the Ford and Carter administrations
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could have made a discreet decision to "put Israel on
notice" that their nuclear ambiguity is a tenuous thing
that an outside power could terminate if necessary by
publishing its relevant intelligence files and thus
centering interest on the Israeli nuclear option in a
crisis
.
On September 22, 1979, a U.S. surveillance satellite
detected in the south Atlantic what appeared to be a
nuclear blast event. Subsequent secret investigations
on the part of the Carter White House revealed circum-
stantial evidence that implicated the South Africans and
possibly the Israelis in the alleged nuclear test. A
secret White House panel convened to review the evidence,
concluded that the evidence was inconclusive to determine
if a nuclear explosion had occurred. 118 The official
U.S. position opted to assume publicly that the nuclear
event was a satellite malfunction and not a nuclear test.
In part, this view is fueled by the fact that no nuclear
fallout, blast effect, or corroborating satellite read-
ings were recorded at the time of the event. Re-
cently, new evidence has come to light, indicating that
the original findings of the special panel were erroneous
and that in fact a two-kiloton nuclear test did actually
happen on that date, which was the result of Israeli-
120South African collaboration. In fact, allegations
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have arisen accusing the NSA of withholding decisive
intelligence information dealing with Israeli involvement
in the test. Possibly this was out of fear that exposure
of the truth would mean cutting off all aid to Israel
under the Symington Amendment, thus destroying the Camp
David peace process (which sets an ominous precedent).
Regardless of current speculation, there are com-
pelling reasons to remain skeptical of at least Israeli
involvement with this "event," the most obvious being
that Jerusalem signed the test ban treaty in good faith
in 1963 and atmospheric nuclear testing in the south
Atlantic constitutes a flagrant violation of that treaty.
Also, why would the Israelis undertake a conspicuous
atmospheric nuclear test (thereby running the risk of
public exposure of their nuclear potential) at a t ime
when negotiations with the U.S. and Egypt to settle all
aspects of a peace treaty were at their most intense?
Could Israel really take a chance on Washington's for-
bearance (no matter how much a diplomatic success was
needed by the administration) in such a flagrant act?
While there is much disquieting evidence to indicate
close convention and nuclear cooperation between
Praetoria and Jerusalem, there is as yet no definite
evidence that an above-ground nuclear test occurred
under Israeli sponsorship in the south Atlantic. The
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only evidence of Israeli involvement as yet being still
classified NSA intelligence data and journalistic
accounts based on undisclosed sources.
Governor Ronald Reagan, elected President in 1980,
came to office with a declared "hands-off" policy towards
nuclear non-proliferation. 121 During the 1980 primary
campaign, Reagan had stated that non-proliferation was
"none of our business." Clearly the problem was un-
important to the incoming administration. Moreover, he
clearly wanted to de-emphasize the whole Camp David peace
process in favor of deterring Soviet penetration into
the Middle East. The loss of emphasis on the Camp
David process (which was heading towards a U . S . -broker ed
resolution for the Palestinians) was compensated for
Israel by Reagan's efforts to forestall Soviet regional
"ad ventur ism."
It is natural, therefore, for the Reagan administra-
tion to strengthen the strategic and political links to
the state of Israel, as Jerusalem is a nominally anti-
communist democratic state with a longstanding suspicion
of the U.S.S.R.'s intentions. To this end, the U.S. and
Israel quickly negotiated a vaguely-worded mutual secur-
ity agreement in the spring of 1981. It is a pretty
tame document, actually, calling for $42.5 million in
increased military grants, joint rapid deployment force
exercises, Israeli docking rights for the U.S. Sixth
Fleet and a free trade agremeent, among other inci-
123dentals. There is no formal security pledge or
promise of troops to Israel, nor is there any attempt to
deal with nuclear weapons or local questions of deter-
rence, save those involving the U.S.S.R. On the surface,
this agreement appears to be a half-step towards a
security guarantee for Israel, but in fact it is really
nothing more than a recapitulation of U.S. anti-Soviet
rhetoric linked to a shopping list of items long coveted
by Israel (conventional cluster bombs, for example).
Primarily, it is a response to an alleged Soviet nuclear
guarantee given to Syria in late 1974. 12Zt Of course,
the U.S.S.R. has allegedly given a similar guarantee to
Egypt in 1966, but given subsequent events in Moscow-
Cairo relations, the reliability of the Soviet pledge is
open to question. In fact, the Israelis acquiesced to
the security agreement most reluctantly, as they've had
little faith in American pledges of explicit support
since the Yom Kippur War. In fact, the agreement in
question is simply no basis upon which to build a secur-
ity guarantee that would dissuade Israel from deploying
nuclear weapons. It is a solution whose time had passed.
President Reagan's policy initially did not concern
itself with regional proliferation, or, for that matter,
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any relevant approaches (top-down or bottom-up) to
regional peace. Nonetheless, a policy would need to be
improvised when on June 7, 1981 the Israeli Air Force
attacked (with American F-15s) the French-built Iraqi
Tamuz I nuclear reactor, totally destroying it with con-
ventional bombs. Prime Minister Begin insisted defiantly
that the reactor was at the center of a covert Iraqi
nuclear weapons program, being conducted despite Iraq's
membership in the IAEA and its full accession to the
non-proliferation treaty. It was the belief of the
Israeli cabinet that a nuclear weapon produced from this
program (regardless of Iraq's then-genoc idal war with
Iran) would ultimately be used as a threat against
Israel. Many observers within Israel at the time though,
believed that the raid was motivated less on security
ground and more with the upcoming Israeli national elec-
126tions in mind. As a result, the new policy seemed
to be if Israel would not be the first nation to intro-
duce nuclear weapons into the region, then neither would
19 7
any other country be permitted to "be first," either.
As such, the Reagan administration's reaction to the
raid was equivocal. On the one hand, the raid was con-
demned as an unnecessary use of force. However, the U.S.
adamantly refused to impose serious sanctions on Israel
beyond delaying ratification of the security agreement
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six months.
and suspending the sale of F-16s for 128
U.S. condemnation was required so as to reassure Arab
moderates (Jordan and Saudi Arabia) and to placate the
outraged opinion of potential anti-Soviet regional
allies. The administration only went so far as to sup-
port a U.N. Security Council Resolution 487, which con-
demned the raid and called upon Israel to place all its
nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. 128 Beyond
making a few noises about violations of both the U.S.
Arms Export Act and the near-forgotten Mutual Defense
Assistance Pact of 1951, this was the extent of the U.S.
1 sogovernment's wrath.
Israel demonstrates its harsh opinion of the worth
of the non-proliferation treaty in general and in safe-
guards in particular. It is ironic that in late 1982
the U.S. had to go to elaborate lengths to prevent the
general conference of the IAEA (which is dominated by
hostile Third World countries) from ejecting Israel from
its membership entirely. Ultimately, Israel held
on to its membership, but at a high cost to U.S. credi-
bility in that organization, although a condemnatory
resolution of Israel's pre-emptive attack was passed by
a wide margin.
The raid is a prime example of how little leverage
the U.S. has over Israel regarding any aspect of nuclear
97
weapons policy. It would seem that the political tie is
so strong in certain s t r a t eg i c-based respects that
effective action in the area of nuclear arms is impos-
sible. As a result of the Osiraq raid, the Reagan White
House was compelled to belatedly generate a coherent
nuclear non-proliferation policy. Eventually, in its
emphasis on the NPT and the IAEA, supplier controls and
constuctive engagement, the Reagan policy, once enun-
ciated, would strongly resemble the Carter policy minus
the apocalyptic rhetoric.
A purely U
. S . -centered solution to the problem
consistently foundered in the Car ter
-Reagan years due to
ineptitude, ignorance and neglect. Suprisingly, during
the late 1970s and early 1980s, progress was being made
on another front. In the U.N. General Assembly in 1980
the Israeli delegation quietly dropped its long-time
conventional arms control prerequisite to a regional
nuclear weapons ban. This was in response to a proposed
Egyptian plan to create a Middle Eastern nuclear weapons
free zone. Israel and Egypt went so far as to co-sponsor
a General Assembly Resolution calling for the establish-
ment of a regional nuclear weapons free zone. Differ-
ences did occur over the initial composition of such an
accord, with Egypt desiring universal regional accession
to the NPT as a prerequisite to a general conference on
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non-proliferation. Israel, on the other hand, wished to
circumvent any link to the NPT and proceed directly to a
multilateral conference. Of course, the problem here for
more intransigent Arab states is that a nuclear weapons
ban conference means recognizing Israel's nuclear weapons
force, which to their minds is tantamount to recognizing
Israel's political existence. This is an intolerable
option for them. Any nuclear weapons free zone would
involve implicit guarantees of Israeli security in he
form of an inspection and verification system that all
states, including Israel, could have confidence in.^^
The model that Israel and Egypt looked toward is the
Latin American Treaty of Tlatelolco, which by and large
satisfies all participants' minimum requirements for
nuclear security.
Fundamentally, Israel sees the problems of nuclear
weapons proliferation to be regional in character, but
also one that is apparently separable from certain other
general political problems in the area. In this case,
issue linkage on the part of the "Re ject ionist Front,"
be it the Palestinians or the Occupied Territories or
the Lebanon War prevented any progress on the question
of a regional nuclear ban. The fact that Israel and
Egypt could cooperate to this extent at the U.N. over
such a far-reaching issue is some proof as to the effi-
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cacity of Carter’s bottom-up approach to regional issues.
Unfortunately, at this time the Camp David process seems
unreproduc able with any other Arab states for a number
of reasons, lack of innovative leadership in Israel and
elsewhere, lack of U.S. interest in such an approach,
and currently the Palestinian rising in the Occupied
133Territories. The U.S., of course, consistently
voted in favor of the Egypt ian- I srael i weapons freeze
proposal at the U.N
.
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The appeal of this approach is that it takes the
United States "off the hook" as to providing the impetus
towards non-proliferation. For Israel, it would grant
limited recognition via the "back door," so to speak.
The Arabs would have all their fears of an Israeli
nuclear threat dispelled once and for all. The nuclear
free zone so far is the only non-proliferation proposal
embraced by both Arabs and Israelis. Moreover, it
points to the heretical notion that the best solution to
regional nuclear proliferation lies within initiatives
generated and enforced by local states, and not with any
program explicitly linked with any super-powers.
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have seen issue saliency in the U.S. government
vary radically over the last twenty years, from the high
importance that non-proliferation is held in the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations, to a militantly passive
policy of acquiescence to Israeli nuclear weapons as
practiced by the Nixon administration. The problem with
saliency, though, is that as important as the issue was
for the Kennedy- Johnson administrations, telling oppor-
tunities to forcibly dissuade Israel from weapons devel-
opment were passed up until too late. The fact is that
President Johnson attempted to coerce Israel into accept-
ing the NPT with time as too critical a factor in his
personal authority with Israel so close to developing an
atom bomb. Tel Aviv could afford to defy the President
and await a new administration. Hence, if Israel's nuc-
lear potential was of high saliency during the sixties,
then it is also true that its nuclear weapons were not
of "ultimate" saliency to U.S. national security. All
other contending diplomatic factors considered, this
issue alone was not worth an all-out diplomatic confron-
tation despite longstanding expressed U.S. interest in
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to the region.
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Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Israel had one simple
goal, the development of a nuclear weapons option or the
purposes of a bargaining tool and as an ambiguous threat
against the Arabs. When U.S. policy shifted and changed,
reflecting new interests being defined by new decision-
makers, Israeli policy remained stable. The ultimate
survival and unprecedented growth of the Israeli nuclear
arsenal is a consequence of U.S. policy instability.
Once Israel reached the point of no return (some
time between 1969 and 1971), the question of pure dis-
suasion became one of how to deal with a clearly defined
but as yet unannounced sixth nuclear power. The Ford,
Carter, and Reagan administrations have all had to deal
with this new stage in U.S. -Israeli nuclear diplomacy.
There is no question that Ford, Carter and the CIA all
had a more urgent view of the matter, but correspondingly
their options were fewer than those available to the U.S.
in the 1960s. This is due to the strength of the politi-
cal link from Israel to the U.S. (which was quite strong
by the 1970s). The United States' own suspicions about
the NPT, the changing approaches Washington favored
towards the region, and as said previously, the fait
accompli of existing Israeli nuclear bombs.
From this fait accompli, no subsequent U.S. adminis-
tration (no matter how salient non-proliferation in the
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region may be) has ever regained the full initiative.
Why? Because as yet no acceptable political formula
been generated by anyone to affect the nuclear disarma-
ment of relatively small nations with correspondingly
miniscule nuclear forces once acquisition of the nuclear
weapons option occurs. For that fact, no "disarmament
formula has ever been successfully implemented to deal
with the huge nuclear stockpiles of the U . S . A
.
/U . S . S . R .
!
The two main regional diplomatic approaches favored
especially by the United States by and large do not seem
to prioritize questions of nuclear non-proliferation, at
least as far as they have been acted upon by the Nixon-
Ford and Carter administrations. Here again, if Israel's
nuclear weaponry is not of "original saliency" to
Washington, then the tendency is to either ignore the
issue or else to relegate it to secondary status.
Although Carter's "piecemeal" diplomacy did indirectly
lay the groundwork for and Israel i-Egypt ian nuclear
weapons ban proposal at the U.N. Although without wider
participation it is hard to see if anything else can
presently be done with this proposal. As for a general
settlement of the region's problems at an international
conference, this is an idea that may never be imple-
mented, due to the inability of any of the participants
to even generally agree on an agenda--non-proli ferat ion
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certainly can t wait for this eventuality.
Israel, though, has managed to keep all its options
open down through the years. The strategy of ambiguity
that Israel favors is in turn strongly complemented by
the low saliency that the whole issue possessed for the
U.S., especially in the critical 1969-1975 period. Of
critical importance for Tel Aviv has been its ability to
portray itself as a strategic asset to the United States
government and also to cultivate strong political alle-
giances within potent social groups with the American
polity. Since 1966, the overall effect of this political
link has been to reinforce the idea from within and
without the United States that Israel is a "political
investment," one that could not be discarded easily.
This link made possible the lifting of the NPT clause in
the 1968 Phantom II deal and generally contributed to
the hands-off policy of the Nixon-Ford administrations.
After the Yom Kippur War, the rise of the political
link with Jerusalem ensured that policy shifts toward
Israel entailed potential political costs for a U.S.
administration. Thus, lacking the domestic consensus to
issue a security guarantee to Israel and concurrently
lacking the political will to force a showdown on non-
proliferation, the U.S. government is stymied. Further-
more, the role of the U . S . - as -arb i t r a t or was undercut by
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the rise in Soviet influence in the region during the
late 1960s. Washington now began to see Israel as an
informal strategic asset, hence the need to maintain an
ally's power inhibited the U.S. power of dissuasion in
Jerusalem. Strategically speaking, since 1969 Israel has
been an informal political client of the United States,
but it is one that has been difficult to integrate into
a larger regional diplomatic framework.
Which points towards a reluctant role change on the
part of the U.S. government-- that was encouraged somewhat
by Israel. In the short space of nine years (1960-1969),
the U.S. went from being a detached arbitrator to being
chief arms supplier and military patron of the state of
Israel. America s ability to pursue certain unilateral
policies in the region were correspondingly constrained.
Israel went from a nuclear aspirant to a full-fledged
undeclared nuclear power, and in turn became a virtual
international pariah state after the 1967 Six Day War.
Moreover, Israel became a client of the United States,
but a particularly independent client capable especially
in the area of nuclear politics of maintaining its
priorities over those of the patron.
These role changes, in some sense, help determine
the relative importance of particular national security
issues. In the end, if we in the United States consider
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nuclear non-proliferation to be of paramount importance
down through the years, then in turn we must ask whether
or not a client /ally
' s acquisition of nuclear weapons is
important enough to require an active policy of dissua-
sion, or, better, disarmament. This is a difficult
proposition, as when the government affirms its opposi-
tion to the spread of nuclear weapons it not only con-
tends with purely national power-seeking behavior, but
it must also oppose an international trend or process.
This trend towards proliferation is transnational in
character and originates in the easy access to nuclear
weapons information. Hence, in trying to combat the
general problem, the U.S. must tailor its policies to
overcome a multilateral antagonist.
The U.S. has made it abundantly clear that it
regards regional proliferation to have grave consequences
for international relations. Israel, being the most ad-
vanced nuclear power in the Middle East, has more often
than not been the main recipient of U.S. persuasion on
this issue. Jerusalem, however, sees the problem as a
regional one, encompassing the need to suppress multi-
lateral suspicions about each other's nuclear research
and reduce the mutual risk of a nuclear conflict. The
Arabs, in turn (paradoxically enough) see the issue in
terms vaguely similar to those of the U.S., the main
106
danger of nuclear weapons exclusively stems from Israel.
Hence, there are mutually exclusive viewpoints at work
here that must be reconciled. The process of reconcilia-
tion then perhaps is at the core of a new stable long-
range U.S. non-proliferation policy for Israel and the
region. Yet this cannot occur until the U.S. makes an
imporvement on past practice, abandonging passive
acquiescence, outdated rhetoric and equivocation over
how important this one case of non-proliferation really
is. The answer is: it is important and it must be
acted upon.
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